What's the point then?

This is a pretty interesting comment from the Chief Operating Officer of the EU's diplomatic service (the EEAS), David O'Sullivan. In an interview with EUobserver, he said:

"At the end of the day, it's the member states that decide whether they want to speak with one voice, and there are moments when there are divergences. The High Representative [Baroness Catherine Ashton] has difficulty expressing a common European view if one doesn't exist...It is our hope that [the EEAS] will facilitate this process...We cannot at the end of the day change fundamental disagreements between member states."

Well put. As we've consistently argued, institutions cannot replace real policies - particularly in foreign affairs where it's clear that the EU remains a bloc of 27 national policies, which occassionally find common ground.

But his begs the question: what's the added value of the EEAS in the first place? If Ashton and the EEAS don't have the power to act in the absence of a common position shared by all 27 member states - a rare occurence indeed - is it then really worth spending hundreds of millions of taxpayers' money every year (€464 million only in 2011) to run a giant "facilitator"?

Given the criticism Ashton is facing (Only two weeks ago, Belgian Foreign Minister Steven Vanackere openly criticised her inability to get EU governments to agree on any of the most sensitive issues - not least the upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East - during her first year in the job), we wonder if the good Baroness isn't starting to ask herself that question as well, despite some good talk.

EU Foreign Policy: Kum-bay-ah or Machiavelli?

The EU’s fledgling External Action Service has regularly been mocked for its naivety and ‘Kum-bay-ah’ approach; all too often it seems to base its polices on projecting a positive image of the EU, occasionally backed by some suitably bland statements, supposedly helping autocrats and dictators around the world to see the error of their ways and embrace reform.

It seems however, that the recent unrest in North Africa and the Middle East has brought a hitherto hidden Machiavellian tendency in the EU’s foreign policy to the fore. Firstly, we had the Maltese EU Commissioner for health going off-message on Libya a couple of weeks ago by saying he “didn't think [he] had the right, or anyone else, to make a statement on whether he [Gaddafi] should step down”.

Now Robert Cooper, senior advisor to EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton, has claimed Bahrain is normally "a rather pleasant, peaceful place", and defended its security forces after they opened fire on protesters with live ammunition last week:

"I'm not sure if the police have had to deal with these public order questions before. It's not easy dealing with large demonstrations in which there may be violence. It's a difficult task for policemen. It's not something that we always get right in the best Western countries and accidents happen”.

His statement ought to be seen in the context of an earlier work in which he claimed:

“The challenge of the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards…When dealing with more old fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack deception, whatever is necessary… Among ourselves we keep the law but when operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle”

This also follows the reports that another Ashton aide was briefing against a no-fly over Libya, which briefly put her at odds with both Cameron and Sarkozy, until it was explained away as a 'rogue briefing'.

These kinds of ill-advised comments emanating from the EU apparatus, and the fact that we'll never know who authorised them, demonstrate inconsistency, and further undermine the EEAS's objective of getting Europe to "speak with one voice". They also underline the potential danger of a power struggle over the EU's foreign policy at a time when Europe is facing an uncertain future.

What conclusions should we draw from Germany's abstention on no-fly zone?

Last night's UN resolution authorising the creation and enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya, and Germany's abstention in the Security Council's vote in particular, is stirring quite a debate.

Iain Dale has been quick to denounce the German abstention as "shameful" and an act of "cowardice".

The Spectator's Alex Massie has countered that:

Having doubts is not shameful and I don't see why we are supposed to think that Germany should have supported the resolution simply because Britain, France and other countries were doing so.

Perhaps I'm missing something, but if sovereignty means anything it must permit sovereign, friendly nations to disagree on matters of major international importance. (And if the Germans are bad europeans for preventing a common EU approach doesn't that just mean they're fulfilling the traditional British role? Which in turn means they must, from the eurosceptic position, be the Good Guys in this instance.)

Germany's aloofness when it comes to matters of foreign policy and military action can be extremely frustrating. Take its unwillingness to get fully involved in Afghanistan, despite providing the third largest contingent of NATO troops, as an example. The legacy of the Second World War still looms large in the German psyche and that is somewhat understandable.

But, whatever one's views about the merits of Germany's perceived pacifism, Massie makes surely the most important point: that countries should be free to make up their own minds and, if they disagree with each other, so be it.

The real problems arise when you try to force these different views through the funnel/sausage machine that is the EU in the hope of a single common position.

At last week's summit, we should remember, it was Germany that blocked EU endorsement of a no-fly zone. This, in the words of the Independent, left France and the UK "isolated" in their call for intervention. This was, of course, nonsense because, as we have seen, it was never going to be the EU that decided on the use of force. The Franco-British defence pact, agreed last year outside the auspices of the EU, was an admission - however small - on the part of France that to get things done militarily, the EU is just too slow, indecisive and unwieldy.

And it was the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that today noted "the tensions in foreign policy between France and Germany are remarkable," adding that the lack of Franco-German consensus was "paralysing the EU".

The Franco-German relationship will always be the most important in the EU (they share a border, a turbulent history and the same currency), but on more and more issues, be it defence or the future of the euro, as France and Germany get up close and personal, the more they start to grate with each other. The FAZ article started by noting that newly appointed French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe's first visit to Berlin was cancelled, albeit with the "plausible excuse" that he had to fly to the UN in New York.

Alright, it's only in one area, and hopefully it won't come to the use of force, but if France begins to see the benefits of a flexible approach to European cooperation, sometimes outside the EU, this could prove to be important in breaking down the EU's monolithic approach to many other issues.

Klaus on the summit

Speaking about splits, here's a pretty frank and thought-provoking note from Czech President Václav Klaus, regarding today's EU summit on Libya:

Notes for the European Council on Libya

1. The Czech Republic considers today’s meeting as very important and timely. We support the measures, including sanctions, that have been introduced up till now on the side of the EU.

2. However, when we looked at the draft of the declaration, we did not find it very persuasive. There is no clear signal coming from it. Short-term and medium and also long-term goals and ambitions should be differentiated. I suppose we have met here today mainly because of the acute situation in Libya, which means we aim at a short-run. Of course, we must be able to see it in a wider and longer perspective and strategically, we have to know what to do not only today, but also tomorrow and day after tomorrow. Some of us attended the EU-Africa summit in Libya last November. I am afraid some of us did not see the crazy nature of Gaddafi’s regime and did not behave in a way which justifies our current strong words.

3. The Czech Republic is convinced that we have to try to help to stop the humanitarian tragedy in Libya now, but without intervening militarily in Libya or any other country, without picking up potential new leaders etc. In this respect we consider the recognition of the “Benghazi” Council at least premature, if not basically wrong.

4. We should be aware of the long-term consequences of our decisions. I warn – and that is the position of the Czech Republic – against talking about a no-fly zone because there is nothing like that. No-fly zone means a war because it requires to destroy both Libyan aircrafts and helicopters and Libyan air defense. It is a war. The pressure we should make is the resolute requirement for Qaddafi to step down without negotiating with him. I stress stepping down before negotiations, this sequencing is absolutely crucial. Unconditional surrender is the only possibility. We should make it very clear.

5. Several side-remarks:
- It seems to me it is necessary to warn against comparing the situation in Northern Africa now with Central and Eastern Europe 20 years ago (Buzek), at that time the “rebels” (Orban, me) had clear views about the future, I am not sure it is the case in Egypt or Libya now;

- The experience with one of the institutions which were hastily established after the fall of communism in 1989 – the EBRD – is visibly negative. It has never been a real help to the countries in my region. We are, therefore, very much against creating another similar bank, we suggest to delete the idea of the “Bank for the Mediterranean” out of the text;

- On the contrary, we suggest to include one idea into our declaration which is not there – our long-term help should be offering the North African region open markets in Europe;

- I heard, in our meeting before lunch, the term “Gaddafi’s money”. It reminds the attempts to find “communist bosses’ money” in our part of the world. Nothing like that exists.

Václav Klaus, Brussels, 11 March 2011

Lowest common denominator

EU leaders - still visibly split - have just agreed on a trade-marked "least common denominator" statement on Libya, following today's summit in Brussels. Speaking at the end of the summit, David Cameron said that the EU's 27 leaders were "united, categorical and crystal-clear" that Gaddafi had to go - which is a welcome statement (Gaddafi is a maniac after all) but not much different to what the EU leaders who matter had already called for.

In terms of substance, EU leaders agreed new sanctions against financial institutions linked to the Gaddafi family, adding the Libyan Central Bank and Libyan Investment Authority to the EU asset-freezing list. It also agreed that "contingency planning" involving "all options" should continue, in case Gaddafi and his LSE-educated son, continue to act crazy.

The communique didn't refer to a no-fly zone, however, despite Nicolas Sarkozy calling for "defensive" and "limited" air strikes - something he said he had British support for.

Before the summit, Sarko said,

"We the French and the Britons have given our availability – under the explicit condition that the United Nations want it, the Arab League agrees to it and the Libyan Authorities that we want to be recognised wish it – to carry out targeted, purely defensive actions, and only in the event that Mr. Gaddafi used chemical weapons or the aviation against people who are demonstrating without violence."

The reluctance of other leaders to subscribe to this reasoning means that the UK and France were sidestepped on this point. The EU remains all over the place on a no-fly zone (and France still stands alone in recognizing the Libyan opposition).

This also appears to be the first time that Cameron has openly clashed with EU 'foreign minister' Cathy Ashton, who according to PA, is now warning against a no-fly zone. An EU diplomat is quoted saying:

The efficiency of a no-fly zone is very questionable. Apart from anything else, European command and control facilities would not be able to get a no-fly zone up and running in less than five or six weeks, and Nato is suggesting it would take at least three to four weeks.

All of this is of course being played down by Downing Street.

That the EU's two most credible military powers and only permanent members of the UN security council are seemingly at odds with the other 25 member states illustrates the limitations on the EU's foreign policy ambitions. Although a no-fly zone would almost certainly require US approval and firepower, in Europe, the UK and France are the only game in town if things get really nasty. But still, everyone must be included, no one left out.

Today's meeting was all about EU self-assurance and will have little bearing on on how things turn out on the ground.

EU common position on Libya blown apart

Attempts to create a common EU foreign policy rest on the notion that a single, clear voice emanating from Europe would carry more weight than a shrill, discordant cacophony of individual voices from member states. This is appealing in principle, but as we've argued again and again - it cannot be achoeved artificially.

During the unrest in Egypt, we noted that when Europe does indeed “speak with one voice”, it takes a painfully long time to co-ordinate, and usually results in a bland, anodyne statement. This is because the national interests of 27 member states have to be amalgamated, so as not to prejudice any of their divergent interests in wider international affairs.

Yesterday’s unilateral decision by France to recognise the Libyan rebels in Benghazi as the legitimate representatives of the Libyan people made for some lively discussions between the EU’s foreign ministers and some enlightening press briefings.

During “an unusually candid” press briefing, German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle said he had been sitting next to his French counterpart Alain Juppe when the news broke, and that Mr. Juppe later complained that he had not been pre-notified, and that Mr Sarkozy appears to have acted "on a whim".

Italy distanced itself from the French position, with foreign minister Franco Frattini saying the UN and EU should send new fact-finding missions to Benghazi before making any decisions, while Belgian foreign minister Steven Vanackere said there is a “difference between engagement and recognition”. Sweden’s foreign minister chose a direct route of registering his bemusement at France’s circumvention of diplomatic norms by tweeting:

“Sweden recognizes states - not regimes. And most other EU countries are the same. Somewhat unclear on what France does.”

The confused state of affairs is further exacerbated by the fact the EU is trying to decide what line to take on a possible no-fly zone which might involve air strikes against Libyan military targets, which the European Parliament has urged them to do yesterday, with Labour MEP Richard Howitt warning that that EU states must “be prepared to change the current rules of engagement on whether military measures are required against colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime”. Today, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy sent a letter to EU Council President Herman van Rompuy which took a decisive position on the Libyan position, arguing:

“the deliberate use of military force against civilians is utterly unacceptable… when the Libyan people win their fundamental rights, we should be ready to support them with the necessary assistance and cooperation”.

Meanwhile, Euobserver has reported Baroness Ashton's people are not keen to visit Libya due to the volatile security situation in the region, prompting the question “what is exactly is it that they are paid so well to do?”

The confusion over Sarkozy’s decision to recognise the Libyan opposition unilaterally, and the lead taken on the Libyan crisis by France and the UK in general have yet again highlighted the difficulty, some would say futility, of assembling a common EU foreign policy.

Let's hope that EU leaders can come up with something more coherent at today's summit.

Ashton's bureaucratic empire

This is the complex spider's web that constitutes Catherine Ashton's new EU Foreign Office. A larger version of the organisation chart is available here. Make what sense of it you can.

Hat-tip "Migrants at sea"

One challenge down, many to go

EU member states have today agreed to impose sanctions on the Gaddafi regime. The decision follows on from a UN Security Council Resolution adopted over the weekend.

Italy, who only a few days ago strongly rejected talk of sanctions, has apparently backed down with Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini saying that the Libyan crisis has reached “a point of no return”. It is “inevitable” that Gaddafi steps down, he added.

The sanctions agreed by EU leaders consist of the following:

• a ban on the supply to Libya of arms, ammunition and "equipment which might be used for internal repression".
  
• a ban on 26 individuals from entering the EU, including Gaddafi, his closest family and a handful other people associated with the regime.
  
• a freeze on the assets of Gaddafi, members of his family and ten other individuals.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton also said that the "complex issue" of creating a no-fly zone over Libya is being explored by EU and world leaders. UK PM David Cameron just gave a statement before the House of Commons, setting out the UK's role in the sanctions.

In other words, following a slow start EU countries are now picking up the pace. The pro-democracy protests in Libya and the subsequent violent crack-downs by Gaddafi, kicked off on 15 February. It took the EU roughly two weeks to reach a common position on some form of concrete measures.

That isn't exactly acting with the speed of lightening, but given the complexity of the situation, it could've taken them a lot longer as well (after all, EU member states are still disagreeing fundamentally on how to deal with Cuba).

What's clear is that the EU institutions themselves - such as the External Action Service - have added very little value to Europe's response to the unrests in North Africa. As ever, what was needed was political will, not institutions.

Now, a common EU policy isn't a goal in itself - a fallacy that EU federalists consistently commit (see Romano Prodi in today's Handelsblatt for an example). What matters is real policies and outcomes. And these sanctions could hurt Gaddafi in a real way if implemented in full, though we shouldn't overestimate their importance either.

Cutting off the links to what quite clearly is a Mugabe-type dictator shouldn't be that controversial (we're not talking intervention after all). A bigger challenge, however, might be around the corner if the violence in the region escalates and there are calls for something more.

A separate, but related, challenge is the growing calls for a common EU policy on immigration and asylum, in the wake of the unrest in North Africa and the potential flow of people from that region. This is an uber-controversial policy area which in the past has split Europe right down the middle.

One challenge down, many to go.

The EU's Gaddafi "memory hole"

Everyone who has read George Orwell's novel 1984 is familiar with the concept of "memory holes", which the Ministry of Truth used to get rid of inconvenient documents and photographs. Well, it seems as if the EU has picked up on the idea.

Apparently, a picture (see above) hanging in the European Council's Justus Lipsius builiding in Brussels, featuring a grinning Moammar Gaddafi (the Libyan leader) happily walking alongside a smiling Javier Solana (the former High Representative for EU foreign policy), has now been removed (hat-tip: Italian journalist Marco Zatterin and his Straneuropa blog).

We suspect that the Dictator's rambling speeches and brutal attacks on his own people made the photograph lose some of its appeal. Why in the world it was considered so appealing in the first place so as to merit a place on the wall of one of the EU's most sacred buildings is of course an interesting question in itself.

At least Solana didn't try to imitate Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who once was caught on camera kissing the Libyan Rais's hand.

We suspect that the EU might be forced to employ its memory hole again before this episode is over...

The EU should impose sanctions on Gaddafi

Over on the Spectator's Coffee House blog, we set out the case for imposing sanctions on Gaddfi's regime (while also looking at the difficulties EU member states are facing in coming up with a common policy on Libya, in what is a painfully familar story).

We argue,

The EU spends €460 million a year in operational costs alone on its new foreign policy department, the External Action Service, headed up by Catherine Ashton. This body - created by the Lisbon Treaty - was Europe’s ‘great white hope’ for the global stage, finally allowing it to speak with one voice and therefore giving it leverage where it previously had none.

It hasn’t quite worked out that way. Caught between Cairo and Tripoli, the EU has received yet another reminder that its bureaucracies and institutions cannot magically replace 27 individual foreign policies, as EU leaders continue their bickering over what to do.

The EU’s response to the turbulence in Libya has been fragmented at best, and contradictory at worst. Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi – one of the few EU leaders with some clout in Libya – initially said that he didn’t wish to “disturb” Colonel Gaddafi since the situation was “evolving”. Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg maintained that the EU should not "get involved too much" because, "If Gaddafi falls, then there will be bigger catastrophes in the world”, though he later said he had meant something else.

In stark contrast, Finland, France – and in more careful language also Germany – have called for sanctions to be imposed on Gaddafi, including a travel ban and a freeze on his and his family’s assets, something categorically rejected by Italy and a few other countries. Still others have spoken in terms of general condemnation but proposed no concrete action, a group including Britain so far. Meanwhile, no one is paying much attention to the EU’s alleged foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton. It all feels awfully familiar.

Does the absence of a common EU stance matter? I believe it does. While it’s true that the EU’s leverage in Libya and some other parts of Northern Africa and the Middle East is very limited, when Europe does pull together it can actually exert influence in its backyard. Enlargement remains the EU’s greatest foreign policy achievement made possible through a mix of aid and trade incentives.

So what should be done?

The UK should throw its full weight behind German, French and Finnish calls for sanctions, including an EU-wide travel ban on Gaddafi and his family, as well as a freezing of their assets across the bloc. Other possible responses, such as imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, should also be explored. The Colonel’s delirious speech yesterday – and his son’s comments that the family will fight “to the last bullet” – have confirmed that Gaddafi ranks amongst the Mugabes of this world (if anyone for a second thought otherwise).

Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb put it best when he said that "How can we on one side look at what's going on in Libya, with almost 300 people shot dead, and not talk about sanctions or travel bans, and at the same time put travel bans and sanctions in Belarus?". EU-wide sanctions could hurt Gaddafi – financially and politically – but waiting for too long will lessen their impact.

In terms of responding to the challenges in the wider region, David Cameron is absolutely correct in calling for radical reform of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, which together with other European programmes (such as the European Investment Bank), has dished out billions to the region, with few strings attached. In future, no reform on the human rights front should mean no cash.

At the same time, the EU needs to use other incentives and tools to promote long-term democratic and economic transformation in the region. For example, the EU should consider opening up its markets to more goods from North African countries on the path towards democracy. This should include agricultural products, which at the moment face a patchwork of tariffs in various guises before they can enter Europe. These barriers are contributing to rural poverty in North Africa and therefore instability. The UK is in a strong position to spearhead such trade reforms.

To give with aid on the one hand and take away through trade restrictions with the other makes no sense. Alas, it’s symptomatic of the inconsistency that too often characterises the EU’s relations with the outside world.

The Libyan protesters’ push for change presents an opportunity for Europe to put this right.

Lords blast EU's Afghan police mission

The House of Lords EU Committee has strongly criticised the EU's police training mission in Afghanistan in a fairly damning report released yesterday. The report concludes:

This was an opportunity for Europe to pull its weight in Afghanistan in a discipline and skills area where it had great expertise. In this, despite the dedication and risks taken by those on the ground, the EU’s Member States have not yet succeeded. Not only was the resource allocation of 400 staff in practice woefully inadequate for this important task, the fact that even those numbers have never been met has undermined the reputation of the mission.

It is the same familiar story of the EU's inability or reluctance to meet its rhetorical commitments on foreign policy with boots on the ground or adequate resources.

The mission, which is due to cost €54.6 million in 2010-11, is at serious risk of failing to meet its aims with 70% of Afghan police remaining illiterate. There also appears to be little or no cooperation with Nato and a lack of a strategic timetable: despite deadlines for military withdrawal set at 2014-15, the EU's policing mission is expected take another 5 to 10 years to achieve its objectives. It is far from clear that such a mission could continue after the bulk of troops have returned home.

The Lords argue that, "The planned size of the EU mission of 400 was always too small to make a major difference to civilian outcomes in Afghanistan." But even this modest commitment of man-power "has never been met, with numbers in the high 200s being typical." The result, argue the Lords, is that the mission "illustrates EU weakness rather than strength."

As we have noted before, building institutions and making empty commitments an EU foreign policy does not make.

Egypt: Europe speaks but very slowly

"Speaking with one voice" has consistently been the mantra or motto of those in favour of a single EU foreign policy. The EU Foreign Minister post, occupied by Catherine Ashton since it was created by the Lisbon Treaty, is supposed to be the mouthpiece.

So far Ashton's statements have been frequent (nothing seems to occur without some comment, however anodyne). But with events continually unfolding in Egypt, the EU has been called on to say something meaningful.

Compare and contrast:

The Franco-British-German joint letter released on Saturday regarding the ongoing events in Egypt:

The Egyptian people have legitimate grievances and a longing for a just and better future. We urge President Mubarak to embark on a process of transformation which should be reflected in a broad-based government and in free and fair elections.

EU Foreign Minister Baroness Ashton, ahead of the EU's Foreign Affairs Council yesterday:

...The legitimate grievances of the Egyptian people should be responded to – their aspirations for a just, for a better future should be met with urgent, concrete and decisive answers and with real steps. There needs to be a peaceful way forward based on an open and serious dialogue with the opposition parties and all parts of civil society, and we believe it needs to happen now.

Still no mention of "free and fair elections" from Ashton, two days after the initial joint letter.

The conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting:

The Council urges the Egyptian authorities to embark on an orderly transition through a broadbased government leading to a genuine process of substantial democratic reform with full respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, paving the way for free and fair elections.

And there we have it, the EU is in favour of "free and fair elections".

Is there a better illustration as to why the EU's fledgling foreign policy apparatus can only ever be a decorative bureaucratic exercise in finding the lowest common denominator?

Today's El Pais reads:

The EU popped into the Egyptian crisis yesterday, almost one week after the popular outbreak, to release a communiqué of predictable inanity...Being how the EU always is, it pushed the principle of precaution. There was no reference to Mubarak or his future.

As we noted yesterday, Le Figaro didn't exactly describe the EU's joint-response to the crisis in a flattering way either and Charlemagne notes that the French press is becoming increasingly vocal in its criticism of Ashton and her foreign policy machine.

It seems Europeans are increasingly speaking with one voice, but it's not quite what the people at the top had in mind.

Lacking confidence

In global affairs, the EU seems to suffer from a peculiar lack of confidence, stemming from its all too frequent failure to come up with anything meaningful to say on the world stage.

This is probably also why EU leaders attach such a huge importance to summits and institutions, such as the External Action Service - they serve as a way for the EU to cover up the absence of substantive policies.

As we've argued before, this is completely the wrong approach. Being an influential voice in the world stems from being a competitive and vibrant global actor with real policies on offer - not from obsessing about family photos, meetings and artificially created institutions. The rest of the world usually sees through the EU's charades, as was evident from the infamous "Obama snub" back in February, when it emerged that the American President had decided to give the EU-US summit a miss this year.

Now we hear that the EU is hoping that a summit with the Americans will go ahead after all, slightly postponed. EU officials hope that they can tack on a meeting to a Nato summit in Lisbon in November.

The newly appointed EU Ambassador to the US João Vale de Almeida - who apparently hopes that he will be "the leading show" among European representatives in Washington DC - complains in the FT about the lack of attention the US gives the EU. “Not being a problem does not mean we should not be a priority,” he says. "There’s untapped potential in this relationship ... We can co-operate better on foreign policy, from Iran to Pakistan, to the Middle East and the Balkans", which is probably true, but again, the focus must be on substance and not handshakes for the sake of them.

A senior US administration official quoted in the FT explains in plain American why the EU shouldn't have too high hopes about incorporating President Obama into its meetings-and-institutions culture:

This president is not a schmoozer – he doesn’t hang out. We don’t feel the need to profess love because it’s a fact of life that Europe is our main partner, in everything that we do in the world … Do you need to say that all the time?

Apparently you do.

So, while EU officials sob about their hurt feelings, here are some suggested themes for an EU-US summit, which could help lure Obama to Europe:

• How to create a financial regulatory framework which underpins global initiatives rather than undermines them;
• How to create a cost-effective model for cutting emissions - one that the rest of world can follow;
• How to cut tariffs and reform rules of origin to free up global trade;
  
• How to produce fewer and better laws to make Europe a more attractive market;
• How to put the money where your mouth is on defence.

Just to start off with.

We are where we are

The phrase "we are where we are" was oft repeated in this evening’s debate in the House of Commons – but sadly for many MPs it seems that ‘where we are’ was anywhere other than the Green benches judging by the numbers in attendance.

While a Hansard transcript is not yet available to link to for those interested in the debate – there are a few worthwhile interventions to take note of.

NB: This was a debate to approve a motion on the EU’s External Action Service – allowing the Government to give its official approval to the launch of the EEAS at the next meeting of EU leaders.

David Lidington made clear that EU Foreign Minister Cathy Ashton and the EEAS may only represent an EU common position where it has been agreed by unanimity among member states ahead of time. Of course while that may work in practice, EU embassies will likely be offering positions before they become official in an informal manner in third countries.

The Europe Minister also said (in what we suspect is a dig at the European Parliament over their refusal to agree to the EEAS blueprint before they got everything they wanted) that those who argued that Lisbon would be an end to the institutional turf wars “were plainly wrong”. He also said that member states had resisted the proposals of the EP that it be able to hold official ‘confirmation’ hearings of the heads of EU delegations, and to bring the entire service under the control of the Commission (and by extension the European Parliament).

Mr Lidington also said that the Government accepted that, despite promises of budget neutrality for the service, the start-up costs and the burden of bringing over national secondees to Brussels would require start-up funding – of which he estimated the UK’s share would be approx £1.1 million (before any reduction for the rebate).

Interestingly, former Europe Minister Chris Bryant suggested that it was “optimistic” to believe that only £1.1mn additional funding would be needed (we share his opinion on this) and that there may be pressures from other member states further down the line for the EU to shoulder some of the cost burden of foreign representation.

Mr Bryant also said that there was no assurance in the agreement that no additional money could be requested in order for the EEAS to provide consular services – something which the UK and other countries are opposed to anyway.

And finally Richard Ottaway, new Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament, said that he thought the increased role for the new EU delegations – the fact that they represent the EU as a whole rather than the Commission – was potentially “one of the most significant changes” introduced under the Lisbon Treaty.

Update: The results of the division were 321 in favour of the motion, 12 against. Parliament stamps its approval on the EEAS.

The Commissioner for Everything

Michel Barnier - the man who was handed the crucial Internal Market portfolio in the Commission following a complete miscalculation by Gordon Brown - is definitely on the move. The job as the entire Single Market's (and the City's) Chief Regulator doesn't seem quite big enough for him. Barnier wants more.

Before Christmas he said that he would make sure to "give his opinion" on EU farm policy to the new Commissioner for Agriculture, Dacian Cioloş, insisting on the need to "preserve farm regulations because feeding people is not a service like any other".

And in thinly veiled criticism of Catherine Ashton's decision not to go to Haiti following the earthquake, he now seems to be setting his eyes on the Commission's foreign policy portfolio as well. On his blog Jean Quatramer reports from a press briefing with Barnier on Wednesday.

After having refused to criticise her directly: [Barnier] let slip a poisonous remark during a press lunch earlier: 'when the tsunami hit in December 2004, I immediately made myself available'. At that time, he was Chirac’s Foreign Minister. Barnier added that at the meetings of the 27 European Commissioners, he would put constant pressure on the leader of European diplomacy (who is also the Vice President of the Commission) on 'issues of foreign policy and defence', implying that there is work to be done.

It seems that for Mr Barnier the world is not enough..

Is there an answer?

As the European Parliament 'confirmation' hearings for incoming EU Commissioners rumble on in the background, we thought we might take a look at Cathy Ashton's hearing yesterday.

It received a fair amount of press coverage (see here, here, here and here).

You can watch the hearing here but unless you have trouble sleeping tonight, you might want to give it a miss. These Parliament hearings were never going to set Europe alight with inspiration, and were always going to be filled with that old favourite - the "non-answer" answer - or the "answer-so-bland-and-long-winded-that-you-have-lost-the-will-to-live-by-the-end" answer.

Example: Cathy Ashton - we have a "once in a lifetime opportunity to create the External Action Service"..."we need to be results orientated".

She identified "Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East, Somalia, and Yemen" as "clearly among some of the top priorities" for foreign policy, and adding that she intends to travel to Washington soon to discuss how to co-ordinate strategies on such global issues. But apart from name-dropping some obvious countries, there wasn't a trace of substance in her answers.

One MEP was moved to ask Baroness Ashton what the next step in her vision for Afghanistan was - and reiterate that a specific answer was wanted.

Baroness Ashton's response: "The next steps are going to be very important...we've had some really good successes in the amount of change in primary health care...but there's a huge amount still to do on the ground and I really want to provide concrete results for the people of Afghanistan through what we do."

While the EU Foreign Minister blazing a trail ahead of individual member state governments' foreign policy is clearly not a desirable scenario, does Baroness Ashton have an opinion beyond what is she is being briefed on by the Commission advisors she has surrounded herself with?

Back in December, Cathy Ashton was told by a German MEP that she would need more specific policies at this hearing, and she assured them that she would have "more considered policies".

But that didn't seem to be the case. German MEP Elmar Brok reportedly said after the hearing, "She clearly still has a lot of learning to do; there are many gaping holes that will have to be filled very quickly."

While Baroness Ashton is new to her job (and new to most things in high international politics it seems), this does highlight some of those niggly points we raised back then - that this new sui generis role blurs the line between transnational and supranational, and as yet it is unclear how it will operate in the 'eurospace' between the Commission and the Council - and above all that the Foreign Minister job is a blank cheque and it is still unclear how EU policy will be formed in concrete terms.

One rather telling question from an MEP asked Baroness Ashton where her loyalty will lie in a disagreement between the Council and Commission on a given issue, e.g. Iraq.

Baroness Ashton's response: "The issue for me is not to be in that position - the issue for me is to bring the Council and Commission together, in order to develop strategic and common policy in the right way."

Right...much clearer.

NB: there is a rather hilarious anecdote on the Economist's Charlemagne blog, relating to MEPs' concerns that overseas EU delegations employ the appropriate protocol staff to ensure that MEPs are met at airports with official cars when they go on foreign jollies.

EU Foreign Office takes shape

Today EUObserver reports on an ambassadors' document from the Swedish EU Presidency on plans underway to create the so-called EU External Action Service. We've managed to get hold of a copy of the report, which is likely to form the basis of discussions amongst EU foreign ministers today and among EU leaders at the end of the week, meeting in Brussels.

The form, structure and powers of the EU External Action Service (EEAS) pose one of many unanswered questions about the detail of the Lisbon Treaty which will only be finally decided once the Treaty is in force (very soon). As we warned in the past, the details about this new service are only now being discussed now that the Treaty has been agreed upon (albeit not yet ratified).

Previously, we've warned that this body could take on a life of its own and eventually become a single EU diplomatic service, bringing together national diplomats with the Commission's existing staff into a single surpnational service, and creating pressure to avoid 'duplication' of diplomatic postings.

But looking at the suggestions in this report, it seems plans for the EEAS are even more ambitious than we imagined. Proposing to turn the EEAS into an EU institution in its own right, with its own budget and "a leading role in strategic decision-making", the report shows that the plan is incorporate the EU's various military bodies and make this a real EU Foreign Ministry.

The European Parliament’s External Relations Committee once warned that if the diplomatic service was set up as an independent institution it would "take on an uncontrollable life of its own" and would result in an "independent super administration".

And as Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero said in reference to the EEAS back in 2005:

“We will undoubtedly see European embassies in the world, not ones from eachcountry, with European diplomats and a European foreign service. We will see Europe with a single voice in security matters. We will have a single Europeanvoice within NATO. We want more European unity.”

In a nutshell, here is what will be discussed by EU leaders this week:

- The EEAS should become an EU institution in its own right, with its own section of the EU budget, alongside the European Commission, the EP and the Council.

- EU Foreign Minister (appointed by a qualified majority vote in the Council) will take charge of the institution and propose how much money he or she needs, authorise spending, appoint his own staff, and take charge of the European Commission's existing delegations across the world.

- EEAS would manage general foreign relations as well as EU security and defence projects, such as the police missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia and Afghanistan or any future peacekeeping operations in, for example, Africa.

- EEAS would have what EUobserver calls "internal cells" dealing with developing countries and enlargement candidates which will "play a leading role in the strategic decision-making" on Commission programmes such as the European Development Fund.

- Member states' own embassies will apparently continue to provide diplomatic and consular protection for EU citizens abroad - but how long for? The report says that "EU delegations should play a supporting role as regards diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries."

- In terms of staffing, the diplomatic corps is to suck in people from the commission's foreign affairs department, relevant experts from the Council and diplomats from member states' foreign ministries. As predicted, one third of senior or "AD level" staff is to come from member states. People are to be hired keeping in mind the need to maintain "geographic balance" across the EU and "gender balance."

- Controversially, staff will be rotated into the EEAS and then back out into their old jobs, with diplomats from EU states temporarily becoming EU officials on equal pay and perks to colleagues from Brussels. And staff would be provided with "common training".

- Member states would be expected to "share information" with the EEAS

- Again, controversially, the paper envisages incorporating the various EU military bodies into the EEAS "In order to enable the High Representative to conduct the European Security and Defence Policy". These bodies are the Civilian-Military Planning Directorate, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, and the EU Military Staff.

- It would also take charge of the Situation Centre, the EU member states' intelligence-sharing hub in Brussels (see here for a bit more on this)

And there will be no real parliamentary control of all of this. The report makes clear that the EU Foreign Minister will "regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP/CSDP", but that's about it. It will have "autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of staff."

According to EUobserver, the new foreign minister will make his final proposal on the shape of the EEAS by April 2010, and the new institution should reach "full cruising speed" by 2012 and undergo a thorough review in 2014.

All of this is important - but of course none of these details were discussed properly in parliament when the Treaty was being ratified, since the text of the Treaty was left so ambiguous.

As the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee said:

"the Lisbon Treaty gives only a bare outline of the role of the new External Action Service, leaving most of the details of its functioning to be determined. This could well be a case of "the devil is in the detail". We conclude that the establishment of the European External Action Service will be a highly complex and challenging exercise."

Meanwhile, in an article in the Times today David Miliband disingenously claims that that all countries will retain their veto in foreign policy under the Lisbon Treaty. But this is simply not true. There are 12 areas of foreign policy where majority voting will be introduced for the first time, despite Peter Hain's assertion back when the original Constitution was being negotiated that "QMV is a no-go area in foreign policy." Jack Straw added that QMV in foreign policy was "simply unacceptable", and then later accepted it.

For a start, decisions relating to the creation of the controversial External Action Service will be taken by QMV on a proposal from the new EU Foreign Minister.

For the record - here are the other areas of foreign policy where majority voting will apply under Lisbon:

1. Proposals from the EU Foreign Minister
2. Setting up an inner core in defence
3. Terrorism and mutual defence
4. Urgent financial aid
5. Humanitarian aid
6. The election of the EU Foreign Minister
7. Civil protection
8. Terrorist financing controls
9. The new EU Foreign Policy Fund
10. Consular issues
11. The role and mandate of the European Defence Agency

Tough luck Sarko

Interesting to note that, according to German daily Sueddeutsche today, France is apparently unhappy with the fact that the new EU Foreign Minister will also be a Vice-President of the European Commission, fearing 'indirect' Commission control over European Security and Defence Policy.

No doubt this is not disconnected from the news that Britain's David Miliband is apparently now in the frame to take this impressive new title, to be created under the Lisbon Treaty (though his chances seem pretty slim).

This is the second time in as many weeks that strong proponents of the Treaty, most of whom weren't remotely interested in letting the public have a proper debate on the content while it was still being negotiated, have raised objections now that it is all but implemented.

Last week it was Lib Dem MEP Chris Davies complaining that the post of EU President to be created under Lisbon is undemocratic (correct). And now France is suddenly raising objections about the dangers of letting the supranational Commission get its hands on security and defence policy, which has always in the past been the sole remit of the 'intergovernmental' side of things in the European Council.

This is one of the more controversial things about the Treaty - as we have been arguing for a long time, the UK has been against giving the Commission a role in foreign policy since 1992 and initially opposed this 'double-hatting' of the EU Foreign Minister with the Commission.

Thing is, it's a bit late for the French government and indeed anyone else who was desperate to push this Treaty through to start complaining now about its implications. The EU Foreign Minister will, like the EU President, be appointed by a qualified majority vote in the European Council, probably before the year is out.

A blank cheque

While the Irish government continues to play down the EU's ambitions in defence policy in order to get the Lisbon Treaty safely passed, some telling comments have been forthcoming from other Europeans this week, which give us some insight into the kind of agenda that Lisbon will effectively authorise.

First there was the news that French Europe Minister Pierre Lellouche was in favour of a budget specifically dedicated to EU defence, just as there is one for agriculture:

He said that, "In order to progress with 'defence Europe', it should not be that spending linked to security is completely separate from the EU's financial perspectives. Why should three member states contribute to the equivalent of two thirds of the military spending of the 27?..We need to put these questions on the table, in the same way as agricultural policy, technological innovation, or the environment."

He also confirmed that the French Foreign Office was already working on the establishment of the EU Diplomatic Force, which should only come into effect if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, saying "In the Quai d'Orsay, we are already working on defining the nature, the scope, and the missions of this new service, in close relations with our partners."

We wonder if one of these partners was Ireland, seeing as they have not yet made a decision on whether or not they even want the Treaty yet? (or rather they have, but they're being given a second opportunity to make the 'right' choice).

And now we have the French Defence Minister Hervé Morin saying that he is "convinced" that the EU will have its own permament military headquarters in Brussels, and that it will not be possible to deploy tactical groupings of 1,500 soldiers without such a headquarters.

He suggested British reluctance is holding up progress towards this goal, but predicted that within "one, two or five years, we will end up with a command, planning and operations centre in Europe."

He also said he hoped that there would be "one day, a Council of European defence ministers" in Brussels, as there is for agirculture or foreign affairs ministers.

Of course, noone should really be surprised at this, given that the warning signs that France was chomping at the bit to move ahead with this have been there for a while. But this talk of actually creating an EU defence policy, funded from the EU budget, and with decisions taken by the Council of Ministers just as they decide on agricultural policy, is big news.

Meanwhile, the Polish government has announced this week that its top priority for its EU Presidency in the latter half of 2011 will be the development of a "European defence policy".

According to Coulisses de Bruxelles:

"Warsaw wants the EU to have a fleet of A400M military transport planes so it can independently carry out military operations outside Europe. The planes could be bought by a European Armaments Agency whose powers would be considerably strengthened. Poland is also proposing a deputy EU Foreign Minister in charge of security questions, and Warsaw wants the future EU Foreign Minister to take part in Nato meetings! One can only imagine the reaction of the Brits to such proposals, which will delight Paris to find in them a strong ally in the East."

The combination of all these statements is important. A dedicated EU defence budget, open to mistargeted spending and abuse on the same scale as the agriculture budget?

An unelected Deputy EU Foreign Minister as well as an unelected Foreign Minister and President Blair?

Presumably the feeling in Brussels is that once Lisbon is ratified, people can put forward all sorts of ideas for new jobs without bothering with any more pesky EU Treaties to authorise them. And allowing the Foreign Minister to take part in NATO meetings will no doubt be one of the inevitable consequences of allowing so much of the Foreign Minister role to go undefined in the Treaty. (He's going to look pretty out of place sitting there next to all the democratically-elected Foreign Ministers around the NATO table. Or maybe he'll eventually be sent instead and on behalf of EU ministers?)

On top of everything else, it is deeply worrying that these ideas are being discussed and touted behind the scenes, and the shape of the future of the EU's defence policy is being quietly nudged along in the Quai d'Orsay and other such locations, away from prying eyes.