What's the point then?

This is a pretty interesting comment from the Chief Operating Officer of the EU's diplomatic service (the EEAS), David O'Sullivan. In an interview with EUobserver, he said:

"At the end of the day, it's the member states that decide whether they want to speak with one voice, and there are moments when there are divergences. The High Representative [Baroness Catherine Ashton] has difficulty expressing a common European view if one doesn't exist...It is our hope that [the EEAS] will facilitate this process...We cannot at the end of the day change fundamental disagreements between member states."

Well put. As we've consistently argued, institutions cannot replace real policies - particularly in foreign affairs where it's clear that the EU remains a bloc of 27 national policies, which occassionally find common ground.

But his begs the question: what's the added value of the EEAS in the first place? If Ashton and the EEAS don't have the power to act in the absence of a common position shared by all 27 member states - a rare occurence indeed - is it then really worth spending hundreds of millions of taxpayers' money every year (€464 million only in 2011) to run a giant "facilitator"?

Given the criticism Ashton is facing (Only two weeks ago, Belgian Foreign Minister Steven Vanackere openly criticised her inability to get EU governments to agree on any of the most sensitive issues - not least the upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East - during her first year in the job), we wonder if the good Baroness isn't starting to ask herself that question as well, despite some good talk.

EU Foreign Policy: Kum-bay-ah or Machiavelli?

The EU’s fledgling External Action Service has regularly been mocked for its naivety and ‘Kum-bay-ah’ approach; all too often it seems to base its polices on projecting a positive image of the EU, occasionally backed by some suitably bland statements, supposedly helping autocrats and dictators around the world to see the error of their ways and embrace reform.

It seems however, that the recent unrest in North Africa and the Middle East has brought a hitherto hidden Machiavellian tendency in the EU’s foreign policy to the fore. Firstly, we had the Maltese EU Commissioner for health going off-message on Libya a couple of weeks ago by saying he “didn't think [he] had the right, or anyone else, to make a statement on whether he [Gaddafi] should step down”.

Now Robert Cooper, senior advisor to EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton, has claimed Bahrain is normally "a rather pleasant, peaceful place", and defended its security forces after they opened fire on protesters with live ammunition last week:

"I'm not sure if the police have had to deal with these public order questions before. It's not easy dealing with large demonstrations in which there may be violence. It's a difficult task for policemen. It's not something that we always get right in the best Western countries and accidents happen”.

His statement ought to be seen in the context of an earlier work in which he claimed:

“The challenge of the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards…When dealing with more old fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack deception, whatever is necessary… Among ourselves we keep the law but when operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle”

This also follows the reports that another Ashton aide was briefing against a no-fly over Libya, which briefly put her at odds with both Cameron and Sarkozy, until it was explained away as a 'rogue briefing'.

These kinds of ill-advised comments emanating from the EU apparatus, and the fact that we'll never know who authorised them, demonstrate inconsistency, and further undermine the EEAS's objective of getting Europe to "speak with one voice". They also underline the potential danger of a power struggle over the EU's foreign policy at a time when Europe is facing an uncertain future.

Klaus on the summit

Speaking about splits, here's a pretty frank and thought-provoking note from Czech President Václav Klaus, regarding today's EU summit on Libya:

Notes for the European Council on Libya

1. The Czech Republic considers today’s meeting as very important and timely. We support the measures, including sanctions, that have been introduced up till now on the side of the EU.

2. However, when we looked at the draft of the declaration, we did not find it very persuasive. There is no clear signal coming from it. Short-term and medium and also long-term goals and ambitions should be differentiated. I suppose we have met here today mainly because of the acute situation in Libya, which means we aim at a short-run. Of course, we must be able to see it in a wider and longer perspective and strategically, we have to know what to do not only today, but also tomorrow and day after tomorrow. Some of us attended the EU-Africa summit in Libya last November. I am afraid some of us did not see the crazy nature of Gaddafi’s regime and did not behave in a way which justifies our current strong words.

3. The Czech Republic is convinced that we have to try to help to stop the humanitarian tragedy in Libya now, but without intervening militarily in Libya or any other country, without picking up potential new leaders etc. In this respect we consider the recognition of the “Benghazi” Council at least premature, if not basically wrong.

4. We should be aware of the long-term consequences of our decisions. I warn – and that is the position of the Czech Republic – against talking about a no-fly zone because there is nothing like that. No-fly zone means a war because it requires to destroy both Libyan aircrafts and helicopters and Libyan air defense. It is a war. The pressure we should make is the resolute requirement for Qaddafi to step down without negotiating with him. I stress stepping down before negotiations, this sequencing is absolutely crucial. Unconditional surrender is the only possibility. We should make it very clear.

5. Several side-remarks:
- It seems to me it is necessary to warn against comparing the situation in Northern Africa now with Central and Eastern Europe 20 years ago (Buzek), at that time the “rebels” (Orban, me) had clear views about the future, I am not sure it is the case in Egypt or Libya now;

- The experience with one of the institutions which were hastily established after the fall of communism in 1989 – the EBRD – is visibly negative. It has never been a real help to the countries in my region. We are, therefore, very much against creating another similar bank, we suggest to delete the idea of the “Bank for the Mediterranean” out of the text;

- On the contrary, we suggest to include one idea into our declaration which is not there – our long-term help should be offering the North African region open markets in Europe;

- I heard, in our meeting before lunch, the term “Gaddafi’s money”. It reminds the attempts to find “communist bosses’ money” in our part of the world. Nothing like that exists.

Václav Klaus, Brussels, 11 March 2011

Lowest common denominator

EU leaders - still visibly split - have just agreed on a trade-marked "least common denominator" statement on Libya, following today's summit in Brussels. Speaking at the end of the summit, David Cameron said that the EU's 27 leaders were "united, categorical and crystal-clear" that Gaddafi had to go - which is a welcome statement (Gaddafi is a maniac after all) but not much different to what the EU leaders who matter had already called for.

In terms of substance, EU leaders agreed new sanctions against financial institutions linked to the Gaddafi family, adding the Libyan Central Bank and Libyan Investment Authority to the EU asset-freezing list. It also agreed that "contingency planning" involving "all options" should continue, in case Gaddafi and his LSE-educated son, continue to act crazy.

The communique didn't refer to a no-fly zone, however, despite Nicolas Sarkozy calling for "defensive" and "limited" air strikes - something he said he had British support for.

Before the summit, Sarko said,

"We the French and the Britons have given our availability – under the explicit condition that the United Nations want it, the Arab League agrees to it and the Libyan Authorities that we want to be recognised wish it – to carry out targeted, purely defensive actions, and only in the event that Mr. Gaddafi used chemical weapons or the aviation against people who are demonstrating without violence."

The reluctance of other leaders to subscribe to this reasoning means that the UK and France were sidestepped on this point. The EU remains all over the place on a no-fly zone (and France still stands alone in recognizing the Libyan opposition).

This also appears to be the first time that Cameron has openly clashed with EU 'foreign minister' Cathy Ashton, who according to PA, is now warning against a no-fly zone. An EU diplomat is quoted saying:

The efficiency of a no-fly zone is very questionable. Apart from anything else, European command and control facilities would not be able to get a no-fly zone up and running in less than five or six weeks, and Nato is suggesting it would take at least three to four weeks.

All of this is of course being played down by Downing Street.

That the EU's two most credible military powers and only permanent members of the UN security council are seemingly at odds with the other 25 member states illustrates the limitations on the EU's foreign policy ambitions. Although a no-fly zone would almost certainly require US approval and firepower, in Europe, the UK and France are the only game in town if things get really nasty. But still, everyone must be included, no one left out.

Today's meeting was all about EU self-assurance and will have little bearing on on how things turn out on the ground.

The EU should impose sanctions on Gaddafi

Over on the Spectator's Coffee House blog, we set out the case for imposing sanctions on Gaddfi's regime (while also looking at the difficulties EU member states are facing in coming up with a common policy on Libya, in what is a painfully familar story).

We argue,

The EU spends €460 million a year in operational costs alone on its new foreign policy department, the External Action Service, headed up by Catherine Ashton. This body - created by the Lisbon Treaty - was Europe’s ‘great white hope’ for the global stage, finally allowing it to speak with one voice and therefore giving it leverage where it previously had none.

It hasn’t quite worked out that way. Caught between Cairo and Tripoli, the EU has received yet another reminder that its bureaucracies and institutions cannot magically replace 27 individual foreign policies, as EU leaders continue their bickering over what to do.

The EU’s response to the turbulence in Libya has been fragmented at best, and contradictory at worst. Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi – one of the few EU leaders with some clout in Libya – initially said that he didn’t wish to “disturb” Colonel Gaddafi since the situation was “evolving”. Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg maintained that the EU should not "get involved too much" because, "If Gaddafi falls, then there will be bigger catastrophes in the world”, though he later said he had meant something else.

In stark contrast, Finland, France – and in more careful language also Germany – have called for sanctions to be imposed on Gaddafi, including a travel ban and a freeze on his and his family’s assets, something categorically rejected by Italy and a few other countries. Still others have spoken in terms of general condemnation but proposed no concrete action, a group including Britain so far. Meanwhile, no one is paying much attention to the EU’s alleged foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton. It all feels awfully familiar.

Does the absence of a common EU stance matter? I believe it does. While it’s true that the EU’s leverage in Libya and some other parts of Northern Africa and the Middle East is very limited, when Europe does pull together it can actually exert influence in its backyard. Enlargement remains the EU’s greatest foreign policy achievement made possible through a mix of aid and trade incentives.

So what should be done?

The UK should throw its full weight behind German, French and Finnish calls for sanctions, including an EU-wide travel ban on Gaddafi and his family, as well as a freezing of their assets across the bloc. Other possible responses, such as imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, should also be explored. The Colonel’s delirious speech yesterday – and his son’s comments that the family will fight “to the last bullet” – have confirmed that Gaddafi ranks amongst the Mugabes of this world (if anyone for a second thought otherwise).

Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb put it best when he said that "How can we on one side look at what's going on in Libya, with almost 300 people shot dead, and not talk about sanctions or travel bans, and at the same time put travel bans and sanctions in Belarus?". EU-wide sanctions could hurt Gaddafi – financially and politically – but waiting for too long will lessen their impact.

In terms of responding to the challenges in the wider region, David Cameron is absolutely correct in calling for radical reform of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, which together with other European programmes (such as the European Investment Bank), has dished out billions to the region, with few strings attached. In future, no reform on the human rights front should mean no cash.

At the same time, the EU needs to use other incentives and tools to promote long-term democratic and economic transformation in the region. For example, the EU should consider opening up its markets to more goods from North African countries on the path towards democracy. This should include agricultural products, which at the moment face a patchwork of tariffs in various guises before they can enter Europe. These barriers are contributing to rural poverty in North Africa and therefore instability. The UK is in a strong position to spearhead such trade reforms.

To give with aid on the one hand and take away through trade restrictions with the other makes no sense. Alas, it’s symptomatic of the inconsistency that too often characterises the EU’s relations with the outside world.

The Libyan protesters’ push for change presents an opportunity for Europe to put this right.

In case you missed it...

In case you missed them, here are a few of Open Europe's appearances from this week - on three very topical issues:

On Tuesday, Open Europe discussed the problems with the EU's structural funds on BBC Radio 4's File on 4 programme. Listen to it here (worth a listen, particularly the part looking at the ongoing problems with fraudulent use of the funds).

On Wednesday, we debated the EU's External Action Service on Radio France Internationale, arguing that it's far from clear that the EU's diplomatic body adds value at the moment - and that the EU should be focussing on policy rather than institutions. Listen here (in French)

We also appeared on the BBC Radio 4's The World Tonight, discussing the future of the euro.

We are where we are

The phrase "we are where we are" was oft repeated in this evening’s debate in the House of Commons – but sadly for many MPs it seems that ‘where we are’ was anywhere other than the Green benches judging by the numbers in attendance.

While a Hansard transcript is not yet available to link to for those interested in the debate – there are a few worthwhile interventions to take note of.

NB: This was a debate to approve a motion on the EU’s External Action Service – allowing the Government to give its official approval to the launch of the EEAS at the next meeting of EU leaders.

David Lidington made clear that EU Foreign Minister Cathy Ashton and the EEAS may only represent an EU common position where it has been agreed by unanimity among member states ahead of time. Of course while that may work in practice, EU embassies will likely be offering positions before they become official in an informal manner in third countries.

The Europe Minister also said (in what we suspect is a dig at the European Parliament over their refusal to agree to the EEAS blueprint before they got everything they wanted) that those who argued that Lisbon would be an end to the institutional turf wars “were plainly wrong”. He also said that member states had resisted the proposals of the EP that it be able to hold official ‘confirmation’ hearings of the heads of EU delegations, and to bring the entire service under the control of the Commission (and by extension the European Parliament).

Mr Lidington also said that the Government accepted that, despite promises of budget neutrality for the service, the start-up costs and the burden of bringing over national secondees to Brussels would require start-up funding – of which he estimated the UK’s share would be approx £1.1 million (before any reduction for the rebate).

Interestingly, former Europe Minister Chris Bryant suggested that it was “optimistic” to believe that only £1.1mn additional funding would be needed (we share his opinion on this) and that there may be pressures from other member states further down the line for the EU to shoulder some of the cost burden of foreign representation.

Mr Bryant also said that there was no assurance in the agreement that no additional money could be requested in order for the EEAS to provide consular services – something which the UK and other countries are opposed to anyway.

And finally Richard Ottaway, new Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament, said that he thought the increased role for the new EU delegations – the fact that they represent the EU as a whole rather than the Commission – was potentially “one of the most significant changes” introduced under the Lisbon Treaty.

Update: The results of the division were 321 in favour of the motion, 12 against. Parliament stamps its approval on the EEAS.