What's the point then?

This is a pretty interesting comment from the Chief Operating Officer of the EU's diplomatic service (the EEAS), David O'Sullivan. In an interview with EUobserver, he said:

"At the end of the day, it's the member states that decide whether they want to speak with one voice, and there are moments when there are divergences. The High Representative [Baroness Catherine Ashton] has difficulty expressing a common European view if one doesn't exist...It is our hope that [the EEAS] will facilitate this process...We cannot at the end of the day change fundamental disagreements between member states."

Well put. As we've consistently argued, institutions cannot replace real policies - particularly in foreign affairs where it's clear that the EU remains a bloc of 27 national policies, which occassionally find common ground.

But his begs the question: what's the added value of the EEAS in the first place? If Ashton and the EEAS don't have the power to act in the absence of a common position shared by all 27 member states - a rare occurence indeed - is it then really worth spending hundreds of millions of taxpayers' money every year (€464 million only in 2011) to run a giant "facilitator"?

Given the criticism Ashton is facing (Only two weeks ago, Belgian Foreign Minister Steven Vanackere openly criticised her inability to get EU governments to agree on any of the most sensitive issues - not least the upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East - during her first year in the job), we wonder if the good Baroness isn't starting to ask herself that question as well, despite some good talk.

"But we have a Foreign Office..."

Now the EU has its own Foreign Office, under the stewardship of Cathy Ashton, what's next on the Commission's list for EU institution building?

Well, today we got an advance warning from the Commission's counter-terrorism director, Olivier Luyckx. He has told MEPs that the EU needs its own internal security agency to "mirror" Ashton's External Action Service. It would pull together the EU's existing security agencies Cepol, Cosi, Eurojust, Europol and Frontex under EU counter-terrorism co-ordinator Gilles de Kerchove.

"There is new room for action at EU level," he said. "This is how I see the change: to set up a system that would mirror the one that is being set up for monitoring external crises [in the EEAS], a one-stop shop for information-sharing."

Austrian counter-terrorism chief Peter Gridling went one step further, saying, "It is time to ask ourselves this question: 'Is it realistic to start thinking about a future EU intelligence service?' I think it's realistic to start thinking about it."

We looked at the EU's growing penchant for data and intelligence sharing back in 2009 and warned that the creation of an EU 'home office' was on the horizon. It's apparently approaching faster than we thought.

The question is, where does the British Government stand on this? It has traditionally been at the forefront of EU counter-terrorism initiatives (e.g. European Arrest Warrant, DNA data sharing), despite the threats to civil liberties, and, so far, this Coalition has been no better. It has continued to opt in to new EU justice and home affairs laws at an alarming rate and looks set to opt in to another, on the sharing of airline passenger data, in the next week or so.

So, keep an eye on this. The UK Government has got form here.

Klaus on the summit

Speaking about splits, here's a pretty frank and thought-provoking note from Czech President Václav Klaus, regarding today's EU summit on Libya:

Notes for the European Council on Libya

1. The Czech Republic considers today’s meeting as very important and timely. We support the measures, including sanctions, that have been introduced up till now on the side of the EU.

2. However, when we looked at the draft of the declaration, we did not find it very persuasive. There is no clear signal coming from it. Short-term and medium and also long-term goals and ambitions should be differentiated. I suppose we have met here today mainly because of the acute situation in Libya, which means we aim at a short-run. Of course, we must be able to see it in a wider and longer perspective and strategically, we have to know what to do not only today, but also tomorrow and day after tomorrow. Some of us attended the EU-Africa summit in Libya last November. I am afraid some of us did not see the crazy nature of Gaddafi’s regime and did not behave in a way which justifies our current strong words.

3. The Czech Republic is convinced that we have to try to help to stop the humanitarian tragedy in Libya now, but without intervening militarily in Libya or any other country, without picking up potential new leaders etc. In this respect we consider the recognition of the “Benghazi” Council at least premature, if not basically wrong.

4. We should be aware of the long-term consequences of our decisions. I warn – and that is the position of the Czech Republic – against talking about a no-fly zone because there is nothing like that. No-fly zone means a war because it requires to destroy both Libyan aircrafts and helicopters and Libyan air defense. It is a war. The pressure we should make is the resolute requirement for Qaddafi to step down without negotiating with him. I stress stepping down before negotiations, this sequencing is absolutely crucial. Unconditional surrender is the only possibility. We should make it very clear.

5. Several side-remarks:
- It seems to me it is necessary to warn against comparing the situation in Northern Africa now with Central and Eastern Europe 20 years ago (Buzek), at that time the “rebels” (Orban, me) had clear views about the future, I am not sure it is the case in Egypt or Libya now;

- The experience with one of the institutions which were hastily established after the fall of communism in 1989 – the EBRD – is visibly negative. It has never been a real help to the countries in my region. We are, therefore, very much against creating another similar bank, we suggest to delete the idea of the “Bank for the Mediterranean” out of the text;

- On the contrary, we suggest to include one idea into our declaration which is not there – our long-term help should be offering the North African region open markets in Europe;

- I heard, in our meeting before lunch, the term “Gaddafi’s money”. It reminds the attempts to find “communist bosses’ money” in our part of the world. Nothing like that exists.

Václav Klaus, Brussels, 11 March 2011

Lowest common denominator

EU leaders - still visibly split - have just agreed on a trade-marked "least common denominator" statement on Libya, following today's summit in Brussels. Speaking at the end of the summit, David Cameron said that the EU's 27 leaders were "united, categorical and crystal-clear" that Gaddafi had to go - which is a welcome statement (Gaddafi is a maniac after all) but not much different to what the EU leaders who matter had already called for.

In terms of substance, EU leaders agreed new sanctions against financial institutions linked to the Gaddafi family, adding the Libyan Central Bank and Libyan Investment Authority to the EU asset-freezing list. It also agreed that "contingency planning" involving "all options" should continue, in case Gaddafi and his LSE-educated son, continue to act crazy.

The communique didn't refer to a no-fly zone, however, despite Nicolas Sarkozy calling for "defensive" and "limited" air strikes - something he said he had British support for.

Before the summit, Sarko said,

"We the French and the Britons have given our availability – under the explicit condition that the United Nations want it, the Arab League agrees to it and the Libyan Authorities that we want to be recognised wish it – to carry out targeted, purely defensive actions, and only in the event that Mr. Gaddafi used chemical weapons or the aviation against people who are demonstrating without violence."

The reluctance of other leaders to subscribe to this reasoning means that the UK and France were sidestepped on this point. The EU remains all over the place on a no-fly zone (and France still stands alone in recognizing the Libyan opposition).

This also appears to be the first time that Cameron has openly clashed with EU 'foreign minister' Cathy Ashton, who according to PA, is now warning against a no-fly zone. An EU diplomat is quoted saying:

The efficiency of a no-fly zone is very questionable. Apart from anything else, European command and control facilities would not be able to get a no-fly zone up and running in less than five or six weeks, and Nato is suggesting it would take at least three to four weeks.

All of this is of course being played down by Downing Street.

That the EU's two most credible military powers and only permanent members of the UN security council are seemingly at odds with the other 25 member states illustrates the limitations on the EU's foreign policy ambitions. Although a no-fly zone would almost certainly require US approval and firepower, in Europe, the UK and France are the only game in town if things get really nasty. But still, everyone must be included, no one left out.

Today's meeting was all about EU self-assurance and will have little bearing on on how things turn out on the ground.

Ashton's bureaucratic empire

This is the complex spider's web that constitutes Catherine Ashton's new EU Foreign Office. A larger version of the organisation chart is available here. Make what sense of it you can.

Hat-tip "Migrants at sea"

Egypt: Europe speaks but very slowly

"Speaking with one voice" has consistently been the mantra or motto of those in favour of a single EU foreign policy. The EU Foreign Minister post, occupied by Catherine Ashton since it was created by the Lisbon Treaty, is supposed to be the mouthpiece.

So far Ashton's statements have been frequent (nothing seems to occur without some comment, however anodyne). But with events continually unfolding in Egypt, the EU has been called on to say something meaningful.

Compare and contrast:

The Franco-British-German joint letter released on Saturday regarding the ongoing events in Egypt:

The Egyptian people have legitimate grievances and a longing for a just and better future. We urge President Mubarak to embark on a process of transformation which should be reflected in a broad-based government and in free and fair elections.

EU Foreign Minister Baroness Ashton, ahead of the EU's Foreign Affairs Council yesterday:

...The legitimate grievances of the Egyptian people should be responded to – their aspirations for a just, for a better future should be met with urgent, concrete and decisive answers and with real steps. There needs to be a peaceful way forward based on an open and serious dialogue with the opposition parties and all parts of civil society, and we believe it needs to happen now.

Still no mention of "free and fair elections" from Ashton, two days after the initial joint letter.

The conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting:

The Council urges the Egyptian authorities to embark on an orderly transition through a broadbased government leading to a genuine process of substantial democratic reform with full respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, paving the way for free and fair elections.

And there we have it, the EU is in favour of "free and fair elections".

Is there a better illustration as to why the EU's fledgling foreign policy apparatus can only ever be a decorative bureaucratic exercise in finding the lowest common denominator?

Today's El Pais reads:

The EU popped into the Egyptian crisis yesterday, almost one week after the popular outbreak, to release a communiqué of predictable inanity...Being how the EU always is, it pushed the principle of precaution. There was no reference to Mubarak or his future.

As we noted yesterday, Le Figaro didn't exactly describe the EU's joint-response to the crisis in a flattering way either and Charlemagne notes that the French press is becoming increasingly vocal in its criticism of Ashton and her foreign policy machine.

It seems Europeans are increasingly speaking with one voice, but it's not quite what the people at the top had in mind.

Policy before institution, please

In regards to Egypt, institutional Europe was lacking a clear line until [French President] Nicolas Sarkozy, [German Chancellor] Angela Merkel and David Cameron decided to put pressure on [Egyptian leader] Hosni Mubarak to implement the ‘political, economic and social reforms’ he had pledged. Until then, Catherine Ashton, the voice of [the EU’s] diplomacy, and Herman Van Rompuy, President of the [European] Council, had been grinding topical phrases about the rejection of violence and the necessity of dialogue.

- An article in today's Le Figaro criticises the EU’s response to the recent crises in the Arab world and summarises the problems inherent in the EU's confused foreign policy set-up, i.e. institutions without real policies.

Jobs for the boys

EUobserver today reports that Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has written an angry letter to EU Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton demanding to know why Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has appointed 'his man' as the EU's new ambassador to Washington when, under the Lisbon Treaty, Ashton is meant to be overseeing such appointments.

Ashton is currently in talks with the member states about establishing the EU's new diplomatic corps, the External Action Service (EAS), and Barroso spotted this "transitional" phase as an opportunity to install Joao Vale de Almeida, his former chief of staff, as his eyes and ears in Washington. As one EU diplomat said, "In the future, if the US wants to send a message to the EU, it will go through Almeida because it knows he has a special relationship with Barroso. Ashton will be left out."

As Charlemagne points out, Ashton, who is supposed to serve both national governments and the Commission, has consistently been criticised by member states for being in bed with the Commission and allowing it too much sway over the EU's new foreign policy apparatus. No one can argue that this isn't a significant and symbolic move by Barroso. After all, he didn't send his mate off to one of the EU's various new embassies in Kabul or Addis Ababa but to Washington!

Many have argued that the appointment of the low-profile Ashton as EU Foreign Minister was an attempt by member states to limit the influence that the post would have over national governments. This of course begs the question why create the post in the first place? However, the 'play it safe' appointment of Ashton appears to be backfiring entirely as the Commission sees her weakness as a golden opportunity to increase its influence over the EU's foreign policy - a far greater threat to the institutional balance.

It is tempting to admire Barroso's cunning but it’s also a bit worrying that national governments were powerless to stop him appointing an old mate to such a key position, given the clear conflict of interest.

Incidentally, Carl Bildt is all over the place at the moment. Having been one of the strongest supporters of the Lisbon Treaty he now claims to have always predicted (like some others) that the institutional set-up that it created was destined to fail. "I’ve always questioned whether the construction would work... the post [EU foreign minister] is set up in a way that makes it virtually impossible", he told Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter.

Just goes to show that there's nothing quite like the cold shower of reality to make people come to their senses.

The Commissioner for Everything

Michel Barnier - the man who was handed the crucial Internal Market portfolio in the Commission following a complete miscalculation by Gordon Brown - is definitely on the move. The job as the entire Single Market's (and the City's) Chief Regulator doesn't seem quite big enough for him. Barnier wants more.

Before Christmas he said that he would make sure to "give his opinion" on EU farm policy to the new Commissioner for Agriculture, Dacian Cioloş, insisting on the need to "preserve farm regulations because feeding people is not a service like any other".

And in thinly veiled criticism of Catherine Ashton's decision not to go to Haiti following the earthquake, he now seems to be setting his eyes on the Commission's foreign policy portfolio as well. On his blog Jean Quatramer reports from a press briefing with Barnier on Wednesday.

After having refused to criticise her directly: [Barnier] let slip a poisonous remark during a press lunch earlier: 'when the tsunami hit in December 2004, I immediately made myself available'. At that time, he was Chirac’s Foreign Minister. Barnier added that at the meetings of the 27 European Commissioners, he would put constant pressure on the leader of European diplomacy (who is also the Vice President of the Commission) on 'issues of foreign policy and defence', implying that there is work to be done.

It seems that for Mr Barnier the world is not enough..

Is there an answer?

As the European Parliament 'confirmation' hearings for incoming EU Commissioners rumble on in the background, we thought we might take a look at Cathy Ashton's hearing yesterday.

It received a fair amount of press coverage (see here, here, here and here).

You can watch the hearing here but unless you have trouble sleeping tonight, you might want to give it a miss. These Parliament hearings were never going to set Europe alight with inspiration, and were always going to be filled with that old favourite - the "non-answer" answer - or the "answer-so-bland-and-long-winded-that-you-have-lost-the-will-to-live-by-the-end" answer.

Example: Cathy Ashton - we have a "once in a lifetime opportunity to create the External Action Service"..."we need to be results orientated".

She identified "Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East, Somalia, and Yemen" as "clearly among some of the top priorities" for foreign policy, and adding that she intends to travel to Washington soon to discuss how to co-ordinate strategies on such global issues. But apart from name-dropping some obvious countries, there wasn't a trace of substance in her answers.

One MEP was moved to ask Baroness Ashton what the next step in her vision for Afghanistan was - and reiterate that a specific answer was wanted.

Baroness Ashton's response: "The next steps are going to be very important...we've had some really good successes in the amount of change in primary health care...but there's a huge amount still to do on the ground and I really want to provide concrete results for the people of Afghanistan through what we do."

While the EU Foreign Minister blazing a trail ahead of individual member state governments' foreign policy is clearly not a desirable scenario, does Baroness Ashton have an opinion beyond what is she is being briefed on by the Commission advisors she has surrounded herself with?

Back in December, Cathy Ashton was told by a German MEP that she would need more specific policies at this hearing, and she assured them that she would have "more considered policies".

But that didn't seem to be the case. German MEP Elmar Brok reportedly said after the hearing, "She clearly still has a lot of learning to do; there are many gaping holes that will have to be filled very quickly."

While Baroness Ashton is new to her job (and new to most things in high international politics it seems), this does highlight some of those niggly points we raised back then - that this new sui generis role blurs the line between transnational and supranational, and as yet it is unclear how it will operate in the 'eurospace' between the Commission and the Council - and above all that the Foreign Minister job is a blank cheque and it is still unclear how EU policy will be formed in concrete terms.

One rather telling question from an MEP asked Baroness Ashton where her loyalty will lie in a disagreement between the Council and Commission on a given issue, e.g. Iraq.

Baroness Ashton's response: "The issue for me is not to be in that position - the issue for me is to bring the Council and Commission together, in order to develop strategic and common policy in the right way."

Right...much clearer.

NB: there is a rather hilarious anecdote on the Economist's Charlemagne blog, relating to MEPs' concerns that overseas EU delegations employ the appropriate protocol staff to ensure that MEPs are met at airports with official cars when they go on foreign jollies.

Flip-flopping Ashton

New EU Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton has faced MEPs today for an informal grilling. It is not her official European Parliament confirmation hearing - that will come later in January.

Interestingly, Lady Ashton is described as "dodging a hail of bullets" by the Times for her failure to answer in any detail, questions on issues of foreign policy such as Turkey's EU accession bid, the Honduran Presidential election, Georgia, EU policy on the Arctic, etc.

This policy tapdancing earned a rebuke from the German Liberal MEP Alexander Lambsdorff who said: "I do have to say we want more specific answers from you when you come back to us in January."

She responded: "At my hearing there will be more considered policies...This is brand new. I do not have an office, I do not have a Cabinet, I do not have a team. I inherited a blank piece of paper and at the moment I have written one or two small things on it."

Hmm... brand new? Nothing but a blank piece of paper? That's not what you said when you were nursing the Lisbon Treaty through the House of Lords.

Responding to concerns about the unclear remit of the post and the general ambiguity of the Treaty, Baroness Ashton of Upholland told the Lords in April 2008, "Noble Lords have rightly indicated that the high representative brings together the current high representative introduced in Amsterdam [Treaty] and the Commissioner for External Relations. As I said it is an important move."

She added, "The proposal is that we have a high representative who becomes the vice-president of the Commission with very specific functions. That is a defined role within the treaty which is vested in one person."

So... the EU's new Foreign Minister, who once said that the job would simply bring together two existing roles, and would have very specific functions, is now admitting that her job description is so ill-defined in the Treaty that within two weeks of her appointment, she still has no real idea what her job either means or will entail and the Treaty provisions are in fact a blank cheque... which is exactly what we have said would be the consequence of so much of the vague and ill-thought out language in the Lisbon Treaty.

We also came across this other rather telling tidbit from the Noble Lady in the same Lords session from 2008: "The new title makes it absolutely clear that the high representative will represent the agreed views of member states. He will not in any sense be a Foreign Minister."

Yet less than two weeks ago, in a press conference following the announcement of Cathy Ashton's new job, Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said: "The Secretary of State of the United States should call Cathy Ashton, because she is our Foreign Minister, if I may say so."

How quickly these people change their tune.

EU Foreign Office takes shape

Today EUObserver reports on an ambassadors' document from the Swedish EU Presidency on plans underway to create the so-called EU External Action Service. We've managed to get hold of a copy of the report, which is likely to form the basis of discussions amongst EU foreign ministers today and among EU leaders at the end of the week, meeting in Brussels.

The form, structure and powers of the EU External Action Service (EEAS) pose one of many unanswered questions about the detail of the Lisbon Treaty which will only be finally decided once the Treaty is in force (very soon). As we warned in the past, the details about this new service are only now being discussed now that the Treaty has been agreed upon (albeit not yet ratified).

Previously, we've warned that this body could take on a life of its own and eventually become a single EU diplomatic service, bringing together national diplomats with the Commission's existing staff into a single surpnational service, and creating pressure to avoid 'duplication' of diplomatic postings.

But looking at the suggestions in this report, it seems plans for the EEAS are even more ambitious than we imagined. Proposing to turn the EEAS into an EU institution in its own right, with its own budget and "a leading role in strategic decision-making", the report shows that the plan is incorporate the EU's various military bodies and make this a real EU Foreign Ministry.

The European Parliament’s External Relations Committee once warned that if the diplomatic service was set up as an independent institution it would "take on an uncontrollable life of its own" and would result in an "independent super administration".

And as Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero said in reference to the EEAS back in 2005:

“We will undoubtedly see European embassies in the world, not ones from eachcountry, with European diplomats and a European foreign service. We will see Europe with a single voice in security matters. We will have a single Europeanvoice within NATO. We want more European unity.”

In a nutshell, here is what will be discussed by EU leaders this week:

- The EEAS should become an EU institution in its own right, with its own section of the EU budget, alongside the European Commission, the EP and the Council.

- EU Foreign Minister (appointed by a qualified majority vote in the Council) will take charge of the institution and propose how much money he or she needs, authorise spending, appoint his own staff, and take charge of the European Commission's existing delegations across the world.

- EEAS would manage general foreign relations as well as EU security and defence projects, such as the police missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia and Afghanistan or any future peacekeeping operations in, for example, Africa.

- EEAS would have what EUobserver calls "internal cells" dealing with developing countries and enlargement candidates which will "play a leading role in the strategic decision-making" on Commission programmes such as the European Development Fund.

- Member states' own embassies will apparently continue to provide diplomatic and consular protection for EU citizens abroad - but how long for? The report says that "EU delegations should play a supporting role as regards diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries."

- In terms of staffing, the diplomatic corps is to suck in people from the commission's foreign affairs department, relevant experts from the Council and diplomats from member states' foreign ministries. As predicted, one third of senior or "AD level" staff is to come from member states. People are to be hired keeping in mind the need to maintain "geographic balance" across the EU and "gender balance."

- Controversially, staff will be rotated into the EEAS and then back out into their old jobs, with diplomats from EU states temporarily becoming EU officials on equal pay and perks to colleagues from Brussels. And staff would be provided with "common training".

- Member states would be expected to "share information" with the EEAS

- Again, controversially, the paper envisages incorporating the various EU military bodies into the EEAS "In order to enable the High Representative to conduct the European Security and Defence Policy". These bodies are the Civilian-Military Planning Directorate, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, and the EU Military Staff.

- It would also take charge of the Situation Centre, the EU member states' intelligence-sharing hub in Brussels (see here for a bit more on this)

And there will be no real parliamentary control of all of this. The report makes clear that the EU Foreign Minister will "regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP/CSDP", but that's about it. It will have "autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of staff."

According to EUobserver, the new foreign minister will make his final proposal on the shape of the EEAS by April 2010, and the new institution should reach "full cruising speed" by 2012 and undergo a thorough review in 2014.

All of this is important - but of course none of these details were discussed properly in parliament when the Treaty was being ratified, since the text of the Treaty was left so ambiguous.

As the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee said:

"the Lisbon Treaty gives only a bare outline of the role of the new External Action Service, leaving most of the details of its functioning to be determined. This could well be a case of "the devil is in the detail". We conclude that the establishment of the European External Action Service will be a highly complex and challenging exercise."

Meanwhile, in an article in the Times today David Miliband disingenously claims that that all countries will retain their veto in foreign policy under the Lisbon Treaty. But this is simply not true. There are 12 areas of foreign policy where majority voting will be introduced for the first time, despite Peter Hain's assertion back when the original Constitution was being negotiated that "QMV is a no-go area in foreign policy." Jack Straw added that QMV in foreign policy was "simply unacceptable", and then later accepted it.

For a start, decisions relating to the creation of the controversial External Action Service will be taken by QMV on a proposal from the new EU Foreign Minister.

For the record - here are the other areas of foreign policy where majority voting will apply under Lisbon:

1. Proposals from the EU Foreign Minister
2. Setting up an inner core in defence
3. Terrorism and mutual defence
4. Urgent financial aid
5. Humanitarian aid
6. The election of the EU Foreign Minister
7. Civil protection
8. Terrorist financing controls
9. The new EU Foreign Policy Fund
10. Consular issues
11. The role and mandate of the European Defence Agency

Intruiguing, but much too late

Just days ahead of the EU summit in Brussels on Thursday and Friday next week, David Miliband will on Monday deliver a speech at the IISS in London, entitled "EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon".

Will he make a subtle candidacy bid for the EU Foreign Minister role to be created under Lisbon?

Who knows - but one thing is for sure - this speech should have come not in October 2009, just weeks before the Treaty is due to come into force, but in Spring 2008 when Parliament was voting on whether or not to ratify it, and nobody had the foggiest what EU foreign policy would look like under Lisbon. Or better still even earlier, when the Treaty was still being written and negotiated, so that citizens could actually take an interest and find out what was being decided in their name. Instead, Miliband will next week present us with a fait accompli.

Tough luck Sarko

Interesting to note that, according to German daily Sueddeutsche today, France is apparently unhappy with the fact that the new EU Foreign Minister will also be a Vice-President of the European Commission, fearing 'indirect' Commission control over European Security and Defence Policy.

No doubt this is not disconnected from the news that Britain's David Miliband is apparently now in the frame to take this impressive new title, to be created under the Lisbon Treaty (though his chances seem pretty slim).

This is the second time in as many weeks that strong proponents of the Treaty, most of whom weren't remotely interested in letting the public have a proper debate on the content while it was still being negotiated, have raised objections now that it is all but implemented.

Last week it was Lib Dem MEP Chris Davies complaining that the post of EU President to be created under Lisbon is undemocratic (correct). And now France is suddenly raising objections about the dangers of letting the supranational Commission get its hands on security and defence policy, which has always in the past been the sole remit of the 'intergovernmental' side of things in the European Council.

This is one of the more controversial things about the Treaty - as we have been arguing for a long time, the UK has been against giving the Commission a role in foreign policy since 1992 and initially opposed this 'double-hatting' of the EU Foreign Minister with the Commission.

Thing is, it's a bit late for the French government and indeed anyone else who was desperate to push this Treaty through to start complaining now about its implications. The EU Foreign Minister will, like the EU President, be appointed by a qualified majority vote in the European Council, probably before the year is out.

A popular Europe, or a politician's Europe?

Open Europe organised an event at the Conservative Party Conference in Manchester last week, entitled "What priorities for a Conservative government in Europe?" You can read a summary of the event here or, for the really keen, listen to a recording.

A couple of days later, on Friday last week, the Centre for European Reform organised a conference entitled, "What future for the EU?" Keynote speeches came from Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg, and Giuliano Amato, the former Italian Prime Minister and Vice President of the Convention on the future of Europe (which drew up the EU Constitution).

The various speakers largely addressed their comments based on the (increasingly likely) scenario that the Lisbon Treaty is done and dusted, and likely to be in force before long.

In particular, there was a great deal of discussion about what shape the new Lisbon Treaty institutions of Foreign Minister and permanent President might look like - perhaps worth summarising here.

The conference reinforced the fact that there are two different visions of what the permanent President should actually look like. One of those is the consensus builder, devoting their time to creating harmony within the European Council and speeding up progress toward ever-closer union, and the other being a figure for the global stage, a big name to represent the EU externally. No prizes for guessing which category a Tony Blair presidency would come under.

Giuliano Amato favoured an EU President more in line with the first description, saying that when they (delegates at the Convention on the Future of Europe) were drawing up the Treaty, "we thought of the President of the Council not as a world leader, but as a consensus builder in the Council", later adding "We did not want a European Obama."

Lord Kerr, a member of the House of Lords' EU Select Committee and a former diplomat and Ambassador, agreed , saying that for the President, "the first task is cohesion and coherence", rather than external representation.

However, the Economist's Europe Editor John Peet said that whatever the language of the Treaty, the rest of the world would look to the President as a "symbol and spokesman of the EU," adding: "this choice is going to say something about how seriously the EU sees itself as a world power".

Lord Kerr said, "I think the European Council next week should do nothing about the President, because they don't have a Treaty base", but added that a new EU High Representative for Foreign Policy (currently Javier Solana), should be appointed immediately, taking on the EU Foreign Minister role as soon as the Treaty comes into force.

It was argued that they could get around the pesky provisions in the Nice Treaty to reduce the size of the Commission by telling whichever country takes the Foreign Minister job they would be without a Commissioner until a new one was formed under Lisbon.

Lord Kerr summed up the mood in the room, saying, "most people here reflect the general European boredom with institutional fatigue."

However, David Heathcoat-Amory, MP for Wells, and also a former member of the European Convention which drew up the Lisbon Treaty, pointed out that "the public don't want to move on from institutional questions", because they still want to be consulted about the Treaty, on which they were promised a referendum. He said that despite this, "the EU will try to leave these institutional questions behind... I think they will rely on the self-amending parts of the Treaty, such as the passarelle clause, so you won't have to ask the people again [in a referendum]".

Indeed David was the only speaker at the conference who recognised that there is still a strong public appetite for some kind of overdue consultation on the Treaty, saying "we're trying to make a popular Europe, not a politician's Europe".

Well said.