Is Christine the answer?

With it being a relatively slow news day, much of the economic and political commentariat has focussed on who ought to and/or has a chance of replacing Dominique Strauss-Kahn as IMF chief. Everyone seems to have an opinion on this; there have been some sensible suggestions, and some totally left-field ones, such as Martin Kettle’s pitch for Peter Mandelson.

Much of the debate has centred around the issue of whether he or she ought to be European, or whether it was time for an emerging economy to take over the helm of the IMF, with China, Brazil and Turkey all pushing for a non-EU IMF chief. Allister Heath made a good point in his City AM column:

“the European-led IMF was always perfectly happy to force much harsher policies on emerging countries. These days, however, it is the Asian and other emerging nations that have put their houses in order and Europe and the US that continue to spend money they don’t have.”

However, as we know, Europe tends to prefer the status quo (regardless of whether the status quo is actually a good thing) and France’s finance minister Christine Lagarde has emerged as a clear favourite.

So is she the right person for the job?

We're sceptical. Yes, she speaks polished English, more Oxford than the typical thick French statesman's accent, which in combination with her background at US financial firms, give her some street cred in the anglo-saxon world (which is enough for the BBC to love her). And she has done a relatively good job in keeping the French economy stable. However, she's nonetheless firmly wedded to what can be described as the ‘bailout consensus’ and state intervetion which as we have pointed out multiple times is a blind alley, and there are plenty of people out there who seem to agree.

FAZ’s Heike Göbel today slams Lagarde’s statist outlook, and argues Germany ought to be supporting a more a more market-friendly voice:

“Lagarde is rooted in the French tradition, that when in doubt, one ought to argue for more coordination rather than for more competition. She is the advocate in chief for unbridled state assistance, and does not want private creditors to participate in the rescue of insolvent eurozone countries."

The Indy’s Sean O’Grady concurs:

“Impressive as she is, the French finance minister is… too steeped in the EU establishment and too much part of the French elite to be able to abandon the euro as an article of faith. For a clear-headed, dispassionate Singaporean, let us say, the decision on recommending that Greece leaves the euro would be a much less traumatic affair. And even if that were not the case, we might still be better off with someone for whom the idea that they are a Sarko crony could never stray into our minds. So while it is true that Ms Lagarde knows the eurozone's funny little ways, she might also be more blind to its failings.”

In fact, the IMF would probably benefit from having someone from outside of the eurozone’s political elite, not least since large parts of this elite - as we have documented - consistently failed to grasp how the single currency would work in practice, and has mis-judged the crisis ever since it broke.

Ultimately, whether this person is European or not is actually of secondary importance.

Is the ESM another €700bn bazooka pointed in the wrong direction?

We’ve just got our hands on the draft treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which comes into force in 2013 and is the follow up to the original eurozone bailout packages - dubbed the €750bn bazooka back in 2010.

As expected, the ESM will have an effective lending capacity of €500bn, but to maintain a Triple-A rating it needs to be backed up by €700bn in capital – pretty huge figures. This means that Germany will be on the hook for guaranteeing €190bn! We can’t imagine German taxpayers will be too happy about having that potential liability hanging over their heads for the next 12 years (at which point the fund will be reassessed). Moreover, given the structure of the fund, €80bn in capital must be paid in initially, meaning Germany has to pay in €4.3bn per year for the next five years – this could even increase if someone – yes we’re looking at Greece – puts in an early request for funding.

We were also wondering what would happen if one of the countries – this time we’re looking at all of the PIIGS – was unable to cover its share of the fund. The draft treaty seems slightly contradictory. First it states:

“The liability of each ESM Members shall be limited, in all circumstances, to its portion of the authorized capital at its issue price. No ESM Member shall be liable, by reason of its membership, for obligations of the ESM. The obligations of ESM Members to contribute to capital in accordance with this Treaty are not affected if such ESM Member becomes eligible for or is receiving financial assistance from ESM.”

This would suggest that no country would be forced to shoulder anyone else’s burden. However, it later adds:

“If an ESM Member fails to meet the required payment under a capital call…a revised increased capital call shall be made to all ESM Members with a view to ensuring that the ESM receives the total amount of paid-in capital needed.”

So in actual fact, if one or more members failed to put up their share, all the other members will be asked to cover it (with the expectation of getting it back, but, as we're beginning to see, that’s far from guaranteed in the eurozone crisis).

The treaty also contains some tough conditions for investors. First, ESM loans will be senior to all other loans except the IMF, which we expected. Second, the disbursement of any financial aid from the ESM will require “adequate and proportionate” private sector involvement (read debt restructuring or at least rescheduling) and thirdly, all eurozone government bonds issued post July 2013 must include a standardised form of Collective Action Clauses - which stop a small minority of bondholders holding up any restructuring deal by waiting for better terms.

Although this is intended to help shift the burden from taxpayers (a good thing in principle), giving investors such substantial warning is likely to turn the market for some European sovereign debt into a ghost town. Why buy new debt when you're being explicitly told that you're first in the firing line?

How this will help wean Ireland, Portgual and especially Greece off their current ECB and EU bailouts is far from clear and could turn the ESM into a self-fulfilling bailout fund.

As the conditions for bondholder involvement highlight, the ESM might eventually bring a necessary eurozone debt restructuring to fruition but by that point the write downs will need to be huge and such a large amount of the debt of peripheral countries will be owned by the taxpayer that the private sector burden will still end up being minimal.

*** Update 11am 20 May 2011:
Writing in the FT Quentin Peel suggests that the latest version of the treaty does not stipulate that ESM loans will be senior to private creditors. Having reviewed the version we have it looks as if its still mentioned in the preamble but not the body of the treaty, so it is possible that it could be removed, which would be big news. But since negotiations are ongoing its not completely clear whether it will be removed or not. We'll keep you posted on the situation...

Spring cleaning

The EU has today released its spring forecast, which updates last autumn’s economic forecasts for EU (and related) countries.

Despite our (relatively) chirpy title it’s far from happy reading.

The EU now expects Greek debt to reach 157.7% of GDP in 2011 and 166.1% in 2012. We can’t help but think that this backs up our (and many others') claim that the bailout has been a complete failure in Greece (combine this with talk of a second bailout only a year after the first and they’re almost making our point for us).

It’s not just Greece either. Irish debt is expected to reach 112% this year and 117.9% next. While Portugal’s debt is forecast to hit 101.7% by the end of the year and go on to 107.4% in 2012. Only a few months ago Portugal’s debt was expected to be around 82% this year, that’s a whopping 20% increase in only a few months!

All in all the figures and the report make fairly grim reading. Over the past year we have seen these sets of figures continuously revised upwards, yet the EU and the ECB continue to maintain that the adjustment programmes they’ve laid out for these countries are achievable and are having a substantial impact.

We think it’s about time the EU started accepting the reality of its own figures and added a debt restructuring to its tools for cleaning up the eurozone debt crisis this spring.

Deja Vu

The EU looks set to celebrate the one year anniversary of the Greek bailout by... giving it another bailout.

The fact that a second bailout for Greece is even being considered almost defies belief. Greece’s credit rating got downgraded again yesterday by S&P, solidifying its position as junk and highlighting the fact that a debt restructuring is by almost all accounts, except the EU powers that be, unavoidable. On top of this, there is also talk of further relaxing the original rescue conditions and reducing the interest rate. At some point one has to ask, to what end?

Not only has the EU failed to grasp the public opinion spreading across Europe (no more bailouts), they’ve also completely lost sight of the end game – finding a solution to the eurozone crisis.

Both the Greek and Irish bailouts failed to achieve anything, except maybe buying time as BBC’s Stephanie Flanders suggests (that’s some expensive time by the way). Both countries have seen their cost of borrowing skyrocket and continue to have massive debt and deficit levels. Furthermore, Greece has ultimately failed to meet the conditions laid down in the first bailout agreement, rewarding it with another bailout as well as relaxing those conditions seems to supercharge the moral hazard created by the original bailout. Combine this with the ongoing resistance to imposing losses on bondholders and it becomes clear just what perverse incentives these actions could be creating.

Relaxing the bailout conditions doesn’t really help anyone, least of all Greece, because the deficit/debt cutting and labour market reforms are vitally important for the future of the Greek economy. Some relief might sound good right now but ultimately these reforms will need to be made if Greece is ever to have a chance of becoming competitive again.

It’s becoming increasingly clear that eurozone leaders are just trying to put off dealing with the situation until 2013, when the new permanent bailout fund (ESM) comes into force, for both political (its after some important core eurozone elections) and economic (Germany thinks its banks will be in better shape then) reasons. Reaching that date seems to be the new end above all else, no matter the cost (restructuring will only get more costly as debt continues to increase) or the futility of their actions.

Unfortunately, we feel like we've made all these arguments before, but at least we feel less alone this time... ( for example see here, here and here but there are countless others)

Geheimtreffen der EU-Finanzminister: Euro-Kernländer schließen Umschuldung Griechenlands aus
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE: Nach dem unangekündigten Krisengipfel der EU-Finanzminister erklärte der Chef der Eurogruppe, Luxemburgs Finanzminister Juncker, eine Umschuldung Griechenlands komme nicht in Frage. Einen Austritt Griechenlands aus der Euro-Zone bezeichnete Juncker als „dumme Idee“.

Die Kernländer der Eurozone haben bei einem unangekündigten Treffen in Luxemburg in der Nacht zum Samstag den Ausstieg Griechenlands aus der Währungsunion ausgeschlossen. Der Chef der Eurogruppe, Luxemburgs Finanzminister Jean-Claude Juncker, sagte nach dem Treffen, auch eine Umschuldung Griechenlands komme nicht in Frage. Einen Austritt Griechenlands aus der Euro-Zone bezeichnete Juncker als „dumme Idee“. Das wäre „ein Weg, den wir niemals gehen würden“, sagte er. „Wir wollen nicht, dass der Euro-Raum ohne Grund explodiert“, fügte er hinzu.

An dem Treffen in einem Schloss bei Luxemburg nahmen unter anderen die Finanzminister aus Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und Spanien teil. Weitere Teilnehmer waren der Präsident der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB), Jean-Claude Trichet, EU-Währungskommissar Olli Rehn und der griechische Finanzminister Giorgos Papakonstantinou. » | FAZ.NET | Samstag, 07. Mai 2011

Pläne für eigene Währung: Griechenland erwägt Austritt aus der Euro-Zone
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Die Schuldenkrise in Griechenland spitzt sich zu. Die Regierung des Landes überlegt nach Informationen von SPIEGEL ONLINE, die Euro-Zone zu verlassen. Die Finanzminister der Währungsunion und Vertreter der EU-Kommission treffen sich am heutigen Freitagabend zu einer geheimen Krisensitzung.

Berlin - Die wirtschaftlichen Probleme Griechenlands sind gewaltig, fast täglich protestieren Bürger gegen die Regierung. Nun sieht Ministerpräsident Georgios Papandreou offenbar keine andere Möglichkeit mehr: Nach Informationen von SPIEGEL ONLINE überlegt seine Regierung, den Euro aufzugeben und wieder eine eigene Währung einzuführen.

Alarmiert durch die Bestrebungen hat die EU-Kommission für den Freitagabend zu einem Krisentreffen nach Luxemburg geladen. Das Treffen findet im Château de Senningen statt, das von der luxemburgischen Regierung für offizielle Termine genutzt wird. Neben dem möglichen Austritt Griechenlands aus der Währungsunion steht auch eine baldige Umschuldung des Landes auf der Tagesordnung. Ein Jahr nach Ausbruch der Griechenland-Krise bedeutet dies für die Europäische Währungsunion einen existentiellen Wendepunkt - unabhängig davon, für welche Variante sie sich entscheidet. » | Von Christian Reiermann | Freitag, 06. Mai 2011

You call that austerity?

We imagine that will be the response by many in Athens and Dublin to the conditions which have been announced along with the €78bn bailout deal for Portugal. Jose Socrates, the caretaker Portuguese PM, was almost boasting on TV last night about how much more favourable the terms were for Portugal compared to Greece and Ireland. In the cold light of day though, most of the details we’ve seen so far focus on what won’t happen rather than what will, raising the question: Where are the necessary savings actually going to come from? That should be slightly concerning for taxpayers across the EU.

The point that has attracted most attention is the easing of the deficit cutting programme. But in actual fact the targeted cut is higher than before, given the change in the level of the deficit.

Previous 2010 estimate and 2011 target: 7.3% and 4.6% = change of 2.7%

New 2010 estimate and 2011 target: 9.1% and 5.9% = change of 3.2%

Most observers, including us, didn’t expect Portugal to be able to achieve its original level of cuts, let alone a higher level - especially when combined with lower growth prospects. That was before we even found out what was not going to be cut…

According to Socrates the conditions will not include cuts to: minimum wages, public sector pay, education spending and healthcare. In addition, there will be no additional public sector job cuts and the retirement age will not be increased. That is a huge list of things that will be left untouched, especially since savings of 3.2% of GDP are expected.

So, seriously, where is the money coming from?

Well, there are expected to be some, limited, cuts to higher scale state pensions as well as a decrease in the amount and duration of unemployment benefit. There is also a plan to raise VAT on electricity. In terms of increasing revenue, there was talk of privatising €5.3bn in public assets but not Caixa Geral de Depositos, the largest credit institution, which was widely expected to be sold to raise funds. So all in all not exactly an earth-shattering plan for saving 3.2% of GDP.

To be fair, there are more details and plans to be announced but considering what has already been taken off the table we’re not overly optimistic.

Admittedly, too much austerity would definitely be bad for the economy and finding the right balance is a hard line to tread. But for those of us who already believe the bailouts to be a waste of money, since they won’t solve any of the long term problems, these kinds of conditions are almost just adding insult to injury.

From tomato sauce with pasta to Honorary German

Bild, Germany’s largest newspaper, yesterday came out in support of Mario Draghi’s candidacy for the role of ECB President, proclaiming him to be a “Honorary German Citizen”.

Clearly they don’t do things by halves…

In February Bild screamed "Mamma Mia!" over the thought of an Italian running the German currency. They claimed: “For Italians, inflation is a way of life, like tomato sauce with pasta.”

We’d expect that it won’t be too long until Merkel publicly comes out in support of Draghi (given that neither Sarkozy nor Bild would have supported him without her private approval).

To be honest, he’s been the only real candidate for a while – in terms of both skills and personality – but the fact that it took so long for an established professional, and the right man for the job, to overcome the massive stereotypes in Europe might say something about so-called EU unity… the picture doesn’t help either.

Lessons from Europe

Last week, Open Europe participated in a discussion in Washington DC hosted by the Heritage Foundation, looking at the debt and deficit spiral haunting both the US and Europe. The discussion can be viewed here.

In a note published last week, in tandem with the Heritage Foundation’s Sally McNamara and J.D. Foster, we also outlined ten economic lessons from Europe. We noted,

The primary lesson from the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is that running large deficits and accumulating debt with no indication of changing will always translate into higher interest payments and likely higher interest rates, meaning more tax revenue will be consumed just paying for past fiscal sins. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are now facing interest rates of 13 percent, 10 percent, and 9 percent, respectively, and still face the very real possibility of defaulting.

The U.S. is on dangerous ground by not tackling its current and future deficits with enough urgency. The Obama Administration seems to be relying on markets continuing to provide it with near unlimited liquidity at reasonable rates. But this cannot last forever. Even absent a fiscal correction, interest rates are widely expected to rise substantially in the next few years as the global economy rebounds. For example, the Administration forecasts a rise in the 10-year Treasury rate of 230 basis points. Add in the ongoing deficits, and investors will eventually give the United States the Irish treatment, raising the cost of borrowing much more.

Read the full note here.

Spain and China: a whirlwind romance gone wrong?

Last week the news was full of talk of a new economic alliance between Spain and China, following Jose Zapatero’s visit to Beijing. Zapatero spoke of promises by the Chinese government to continue buying billions of euros worth of Spanish government debt. There was even some chatter about a substantial $13bn investment by the Chinese sovereign wealth fund (CIC) combined with private investors. It looked like a match made in heaven.

Alas, as with many whirlwind romances (we felt one night stand might be a bit harsh), everything was not as it seemed. As often is the case, one partner (Spain) seemed much keener on the whole arrangement than the other, and went off touting the new relationship to its friends (the Spanish and European media in this case). Unfortunately, the other partner was looking for a more ‘at arm’s length’ type deal and China began to distance itself from the rumours. The whole charade was put down to “an error of communication”.

Spain was eventually forced into a slightly humiliating retraction of Zapatero’s initial statement and an awkward silence has since prevailed. Despite being a slightly comic interlude to the ongoing depression of the eurozone crisis this whole situation highlights that there is no easy answer for Spain. It needs to continue with its economic reforms and spending cuts, and maybe markets will continue to support it. This is especially true now that the hope of finding a sugar daddy to help fund it over the next few years has been ruled out (although we’re fairly sure America has dibs on China’s funding of debt anyway).

(H/T to FT Beyondbrics blog for the brilliant metaphor)

The Great Euro Gamble

In today's Wall Street Journal we argue,

"When European Union leaders forged their monetary union without a full political and economic merger, they gambled on two vital factors: That economic forces could be kept in check, and that national democracies could be managed.

Over the past 16 months, we have been reminded time and again exactly how big and how irresponsible those gambles were. Sunday's was arguably the strongest reminder yet, courtesy of the anti-euro True Finns party that may hold the balance of power in the next Finnish government. Paris, Berlin and Brussels seem not to have factored Nordic populism into their grand plans for the euro. But ultimately the euro zone is about politics, and politics remain as local as they ever were."

We go on,

"The True Finns' success will not change European politics overnight, and the party may not even succeed in blocking Finland's participation in future bailouts. But, irrespective of what we think of the True Finns, the election does highlight how powerfully a euro-zone crisis can contribute to shaping national politics. Euro bailouts were also an important issue in Slovakia's elections last year, and helped to deliver a new governing coalition that refused to take part in Europe's Greek bailout. That government only reluctantly kicked in later to help create the temporary bailout fund that euro leaders are now looking to replace after 2013.

This year the True Finns asked voters to consider the same question that Slovaks did last year: Why should they work harder and retire later to pay for the mistakes and wasteful habits of southern European governments? This "triple-A populism" has proven a powerful force in a number of countries with sparkling credit ratings, including Germany. Writ large, this weekend's Finnish elections are a rebuke of one of the euro zone's central, and fatal, conceits: that political ambition can trump economic and democratic realities."

Looking at EU leaders' gamble on being able to keep economic forces in check, we note,

"Markets have now finally woken up to the fact that Greece and Germany are poles apart; it is time for EU leaders to do so as well. Ireland, Greece and Portugal have made all too clear that economic forces can rarely be predicted, let alone contained.

Some particularly federal-minded EU leaders took this as a pretext to push even harder for a full-fledged fiscal union. Former European Commission President Romano Prodi wrote in an op-ed in the Financial Times last May that "When the euro was born everyone knew that sooner or later a crisis would occur. . . . I was warning years ago that, through no one's fault in particular, extraordinary events could occur that would force joint co-ordination of fiscal policies."

That sentiment spurred EU leaders to take their next major gamble, which was even riskier than the first: They bet that once they did start to effect robust economic and political union, national voters and parliaments would play along and vote the "right" way. So last year, when the EU elites decided to break their own treaties and turn the euro zone into a de facto debt union, they forced taxpayers in some countries to take on the liabilities of foreign governments in other countries—without the possibility of voting these governments out of office. But taxpayers are now showing signs of revolt. "

We conclude,

"Will EU politicians' second gamble turn out as ill-judged as their first? Time will tell. But one thing is clear. The political price that European leaders are paying to keep their flawed project afloat continues to rise."

Wrestling with a Greek restructuring

The talk of a Greek restructuring has resurfaced again, following Wolfgang Schauble’s seeming acceptance that one might be necessary in the near future. It looks like he’s back tracked today, claiming he was ‘misinterpreted’, but the damage was already done - Greek cost of borrowing has already hit new highs and the euro weakened significantly.

As we’ve noted on this blog many times (here and here, for example) and in our Greece paper, a debt restructuring is unavoidable, Greece is essentially insolvent. It’s been trying hard to enact the necessary austerity but the evidence is against the government – tax revenues have barely increased, spending cuts are proving hard to enact and the population is already fed up with austerity in all its forms.

There are a couple of points which have been raised with us recently on the negatives of a Greek debt restructuring: it will take down the Greek banking sector and there is significant moral hazard. Undoubtedly, it is a risky proposal but from what we can see, there are few other options to tackle the long term (and in this case short term) problems.

On the risk to the banking sector, there is no doubt that Greek banks hold huge amounts of Greek sovereign debt but that just serves to underline that they’re unsustainable. All the large Greek banks need to be restructured and recapitalised. Combining this with a sovereign debt restructuring is just good sense. They may need some capital injection and a lot of ECB help, they may even need to be nationalised while all this takes place but in the end the newly streamlined banks will serve the economy far better than the bloated inefficient current ones ever could.

As for the moral hazard, it is a valid concern that it could encourage other nations to seek debt relief but unfortunately we’re now in the realm of lesser evils. With bailouts or fiscal transfers you get a double moral hazard – firstly to the governments, who are not being reprimanded for their profligacy, and secondly to banks, who took huge risks which they could not cover – at least a restructuring shares the burden between the two.

It looks like Greece is coming to the end of the road, a decision needs to be made otherwise a chaotic default could be on the cards before 2013 and nobody wants that. Greece is priced out of the markets for the foreseeable future, the public is fed up with austerity and taxpayers across Europe are tired of paying to support ailing economies; what more is there to lose from a debt restructuring?

Performance problems

The problems facing German banks (and banks as a whole) have been slightly under reported in recent months. This week, though, has seen a spate of reports which pick up on just that issue.

The IMF Global Financial Stability Report pinpointed the Irish and German banks as the ones with the most "acute" need to rollover debt. Both banking sectors have about half of their outstanding debt due in the next couple of years. So expect a refinancing rush in the not too distant future (although the more immediate concern for most German banks is whether they can raise enough capital to make sure they pass the next round of stress tests).

Interestingly (and commendably), the IMF takes a much higher threshold for capital requirements than the EBA (8% compared to 5%). According to the report, a third of all European banks don't meet the IMF core capital requirements. This highlights just how lax the EBA is being in its assessments, and how precarious the position of many banks is.

According to PWC, German banks are holding €225bn in "non performing loans" - these are loans which are unlikely to be repaid (to compare: UK banks hold €175bn. Irish and Spanish banks hold €110bn and €100bn respectively). The sheer volume of risky loans held by German banks is surprising, especially considering that they hold more than the UK banking sector which is far larger. These figures are only going to increase as well, thanks to poor economic growth and the looming ECB rate rises. Once these losses start being realised they could pose a serious problem for the smaller German banks, who already have capitalisation issues.

(Yesterday it emerged that the German state of Lower Saxony will pump a further €600m of capital into regional bank NordLB, in which it holds the biggest share, aiming to help it pass EU stress tests. We're sure the Lower Saxony taxpayers are thrilled with that!)

On the surface this may seem like it detracts from the problems of the periphery and could even reduce the 'piousness' which many have accused Germany of. However, this is probably far from the truth. Unfortunately, these banking problems are systemic and not enough is being done to tackle them (or even root out their full extent).

So what needs to be done?

Well, (not that we like harping on about it) effective and transparent stress tests would be a good place to start. Combining some peripheral debt restructuring with a widespread recapitalisation programme for European banks should be the ultimate goal. This might be a painful process but it would finally deal with the issues that have been hanging around since the start of the financial crisis. There also needs to be a plan for winding down insolvent and inefficient banks (to be fair there is a 2001 directive which outlines one, but it needs updating and some political will to enforce it).

European leaders continue to turn a blind eye to the dire state of European banks and in this instance Germany is as, if not more, guilty. The level of non-performing loans, huge exposure to peripheral economies and large amounts of debt maturing highlight the trifecta of problems which European banks face; shouldn't EU leaders at least try and deal with one of them?

Why is Portugal in trouble?

Solving the problem should undoubtedly be the priority now, but looking at how Portugal got into this mess might help to formulate a solution.

Clearly there were many factors which helped to precipitate the current crisis, including numerous domestic political and policy mistakes. However, being a member of the single currency definitely seems to have played a part.

According to an interesting paper published by European Commission officials, joining the euro had the following consequences:

"The Portuguese economy went from a boom led by in the second half of the nineties to a marked slowdown in this decade (Chart 1). A major impulse for the expansion was the considerable fall in interest rates when the prospect of accession to EMU became increasingly self-validating. Nominal short-term interest rates fully converged to those at the common low level set by the ECB (Chart 2)."

The paper suggests that the "substantial fall in interest rates, [was] the main trigger for the boom", which later resulted in a bust. The interesting difference with Portugal, compared to Spain, Ireland and Greece, is that it experienced the infamous boom - bust dynamics before it entered the eurozone, but still because of the "prospect of accession to EMU", as the officials put it.

The eurozone's "sleeping pill" dynamics (as Herman Van Rompuy puts it) have prevented investors from forcing the country into unpopular, but necessary, reforms to boost competitiveness, resulting in Portugal becoming 21% less competitive relative to Germany over the past decade (this looks to be true of the past and current crisis).

So when Portugal experienced its bust, long before Spain and Ireland experienced theirs, there wasn't a currency which could come under strain and thereby discipline the politicians. This was surely one of the reasons for the consistently sluggish growth in Portugal following its bust.

There is, obviously, more to it though. Thanks to the ECB's artificially low interest rates, which were designed for a slow growing Germany, the country started accumulating very high levels of private debt, up to more than 200 percent of GDP (just like in Spain and Ireland, however, they managed to grow at the same time ).

On top of all of this, the Portuguese government hasn't exactly been a shining example of sound budgetary management. It has run large budget deficits for many years and has accumulated a significant level of debt for an economy the size of Portugal's (both the debt and deficit figures for last year were recently revised upwards as well).

Fundamentally however, an overvalued currency which prevented growth (the Escudo would have decreased in value following the original bust), combined with interest rates which were an ongoing stimulus to take on new debt, left Portugal with a decade of low growth. The resulting fall in relative living standards, compared to the rest of the EU, and the fall in tax receipts further fuelled the build up of both private and pubic debt.

Interestingly, Portugal's problems can provide some hint at what the future may hold for Greece, Ireland and possibly Spain. Even loose monetary policy and boosts in liquidity (admittedly in debt form) didn't solve Portugal's underlying competitiveness and currency problems, in fact they may have made things worse.

These lessons from Portugal's past should be heeded by those in charge. Tackling the root causes of this crisis - eurozone imbalances, competitiveness problems and the banking crisis - is of paramount importance, as is providing for all eventualities, including a restructuring and possibly even a change in eurozone membership.

The political lesson from the Portuguese bail-out: don’t give up EU vetoes

Over on Conservative Home we argue that the main political lesson for the UK government from the Portuguese bail-out is don’t give up EU vetoes without thinking through all possible consquences. We argue:

"And here’s the thing, the reason why the UK is now required to underwrite a Portuguese bail-out to the tune of £3-4 bn (partly via the EU budget, the legality of which is dubious, party via the IMF, which is fair game) isn’t Alistair Darling, who signed the emergency bail-out deal in May last year, or George Osborne, who allegedly was consulted by Darling. The UK long ago gave up its veto over the part of the EU treaties – the now infamous article 122 – that can be used to commit Britain to financially assisting an EU country in trouble, if that country is hit by a “natural disaster” or “occurrences beyond its control.” Even if Darling, or Osborne for that matter, had objected to the emergency EU bail-out fund last May, they would probably have been outvoted as the decision was subject to majority voting (whether a UK Chancellor, even if he had had a veto, would have wanted to block the deal, given the enormous financial and political pressures at work is also open to debate).

The question then is, whose brilliant idea was it to give up the veto over article 122 – which has effectively become the financial equivalent to Nato’s Article 5 on mutual military assistance?"

To get the answer, read the full post.

When those who claim to know get it wrong

Last June, we published a pamphlet titled "They Said It: how the EU elite got it wrong on the euro", in which we compared what politicians, central bankers, journalists and opinion makers said about the Single Currency before the eurozone crisis erupted - to what they say now. It's a pretty shocking read, and should make people think twice before making the argument against EU-related referenda on the grounds that 'average people are too stupid to understand such complex issues'. On the euro, by far the most important issue relating to the European project, it was the elite (in politics, in media and elsewhere) who got it spectacularly wrong - for whatever reason: political vanity, ideology, short-term thinking, ignorance or plain incompetence.

Take the FT's Wolfgang Munchau, for example. For years, the guy churned out columns praising the euro, sometimes with caveats, but nothing like the stuff we're seeing now.

Back in 2006, Munchau argued:

"There is not the slightest danger of a break-up of the Eurozone. On the contrary, I expect the Eurozone to be exceptionally stable in the long run. Make no mistake, the Eurozone is here to stay".

And in 2008,

"The world's two large reserve currencies, the dollar and the euro, offer more protection from speculative attack than a free-floating offshore currency unit. The UK will at some point have to make a choice whether it wants to be in the Eurozone or whether it wants to seek an alternative use for those rather tall buildings in the heart of London".

We're not saying that he's not making many valid and interesting points in his columns. But seriously, these are painfully inaccurate predictions. And compare to what he's been saying over the last few months:

“The probability of scenario four [eurozone break-up] cannot be zero or even close to zero. When the eurozone crisis broke out, the probability of failure was considered as small, but non-trivially positive. It is higher now despite the ‘whatever it takes’ pledge…My point is that if Germany is serious about limited liability – and I believe it is – the probability of a break-up is anything but tiny.”

Trust us, we can make the list of contradictory quotes from Munchau very very long. In fact, we could write a new "They said it" every single month, and wouldn't have any difficulty filling it with material, as established figures continue to contradict themselves on the euro.

Take this from the BBC's economics editor Robert Peston - who clearly is a clever and nice chap - but on potential UK liabilities in a Portugal bail-out he was just plain wrong, as we noted at the time. Two weeks ago - when it was becoming obvious that Portugal would had to seek a bail-out -he noted on his blog and on the Today Programme (and contrary to what we said):

“Only in the event that the Portuguese financial crisis exhausted the available money in the eurozone's bail out fund - which it won't - would the UK become liable.”

Last week, when the Treasury had confirmed that the UK will be partly liable, Peston did a U-turn:

“First of all, it does now look as though the implied UK contribution to the Portuguese bailout will be around 4.8bn euros or £4.2bn (in line with what I've been saying).”

Excuse us?

Okay, so the eurozone crisis is a moving target and we all get stuff wrong from time to time, but this is pretty bad. It's also interesting that those complaining about the poor coverage of EU issues in UK media never quite seem to look at the flip side of the coin.

A dog eat dog world

This placard seems to capture how a lot of Portuguese are today feeling about their economic future - Socrates is the poodle in Merkel's arms. (hat-tip FTD)

Another one bites the dust…

Portugal’s announcement that it too will tap the EU/IMF bail-out fund comes as no surprise. As we’ve argued many times before, it was merely a question of time. The announcement has however send eurozone hawks into a tailspin as questions over the amount, timing and conditions remain to be answered. Here’s some leaks picked up from the Portuguese press and elsewhere.

The size of the bail-out is expected to fall between €70bn to €90bn. Jornal de Negócios today reports that Jean-Claude Juncker says €75bn could be “appropriate”. Similar figures have been flying around for some time though. The Portuguese papers are somewhat less conservative, with many papers citing Diário Económico's estimate that the figure could rise to €90bn.

Público report that Guy Schuller, a Spokesperson for Jean-Claude Juncker says that technically there is no reason why some of the bail-out cannot arrive before the elections. This is also backed up by a European source close to tomorrow’s ECOFIN meeting who is cited in Dow Jones saying, “It will be difficult to concede a total package to a caretaker government” but “part of the resources could arrive before the elections”. “The preliminary technical work for the case of Portugal has already been done”, making it possible to issue the resources with “great speed”, claims the source.

The bail-out news has received a mixed response within Portugal, President Anibal Cavaco welcomed the move, announcing his support for caretaker PM José Sócrates and calling for “an attitude of responsible cooperation from the opposition parties”.

Opposition leader Pedro Passos said he supports the move, claiming it’s a way “to guarantee the national security and to preserve the reputation of Portugal abroad”. However, Reuters quotes a senior EU official who said that “the conditions demanded by Brussels are going to be very similar to the measures of the PEC, rejected in March by Parliament”. The same conditions which Passos so vehemently opposed just two weeks ago.

A Portuguese government source confirmed today that a bail-out will only be arranged with the support of the opposition. The National Federation of Trade Unions for the public sector will hold a strike on 6 May under the guise of getting “the IMF out of Portugal”, reports Diário Económico.

Meanwhile, the President of the Portuguese Banking Association has said that the ECB gave “clear instructions” to the banks to reduce their exposure to the government and other public sector bodies.

Some straight talking from Borg

Anders Borg, the Finance Minister of non-euro member Sweden, today had some strong things to say about how the Portuguese government has handled itself. He told Swedish Radio:

"We have reason to be very critical of the Portuguese government. This is a decision that should have been made in November, December. It’s been obvious for a long time that this country can’t stand on its own two feet.

There have been very frank discussions but the discussions have got stuck in internal political discussions instead of the necessary decisions are being made.

The Portuguese government has made the situation worse for itself and has contributed to an uncertain situation which has cost jobs and wealth in other countries. So we have reason to be strongly critical of them."

On the question on whether Sweden will contribute to a bail-out,

“It’s so complicated so we need to wait until some pieces fall into place.”

Pretty tough talk.

Portugal: so what are the options?

Despite Portugal asking for a bailout there is still massive uncertainty over what form a bailout would take and how large it would need to be. Below we have broken down the potential size of the bailouts and what funding needs they could cover in Portugal. We have also looked at what amount the UK would be liable for in each (as outlined in our briefing on the Portugal bail-out published the other week):

Total cost of a Portuguese bail-out: €60bn
Debt maturing this year = €12.3bn (Short and Long term from June onwards)
Debt maturing in 2012 and 2013 = €17.25bn (Long term only)
Deficit for the next three years = €28.3bn (2011 - 2013)
(This leaves €2.15bn leftover, which could be used to aid the banking sector, or simply to allow some room for manoeuvre within the bail-out)

This is likely the lowest viable level for a bail-out package since it only just manages to cover Portugal up to the end of 2013. Any lower and the money would not be sufficient to cover Portugal’s costs for a reasonable amount of time.

Total cost of a Portuguese bail-out: €70bn
Debt maturing this year = €16.8bn (Short and Long term from April onwards)
Debt maturing in the next three years = €23.8bn (Long term only)
Deficit for the next three years = €24.74bn (Apr 2011 – mid 2014)
Banking sector aid = €5bn

At this level Portugal could be taken off the markets from now until mid 2014, we expect a full bailout of Portugal to be of this magnitude (possibly up to €75bn)

Total amount of a Portuguese bail-out: €80bn
Debt maturing this year = €16.8bn (Short and Long term from April onwards)
Debt maturing up to the end of 2014= €30.4bn (Long term only)
Deficit for the next three years = €27.1bn (Apr 2011 – end 2014)
Banking Sector Aid = €5.7bn

An €80bn bail-out package could take Portugal off the market until the end of 2014. This includes covering the debt as well as the deficit from now until the end of 2014. There would also be scope to provide the banking sector with €5.7bn to aid recapitalisation or to encourage lending to households and SMEs. This will be a harder sell to some of the Triple A rated countries, especially if they believe Portugal could make do with less.

Total amount of a Portuguese bail-out: €90bn
Debt maturing this year = €16.8bn (Short and Long term from April onwards)
Debt maturing up to the end of 2014= €30.4bn (Long term only)
Deficit for the next three years = €27.1bn (Apr 2011 – end 2014)
Banking Sector Aid = €15.7bn

The extra funding here could be put towards covering or reducing some of the short term debt which may still be required for unforeseen funding costs over the three years. This amount could be floated as a way to make sure there are no renegotiations or shortage of funding as seen in Greece and Ireland.

Obviously, the amount that the UK would be liable for increases with the level of the bail-outs, however, there is still a very large range given the various structures which the bail-out could take:


It is important to note that any bail-out would not impose direct costs onto the UK, other than the cash contributions which the UK makes to the IMF. However, a bailout is still significant for UK taxpayers, as it effectively requires them to underwrite the debt of peripheral eurozone economies. The liabilities also significantly increase the level of UK exposure to these economies. In any case, if a firm took on large liabilities they would need to be declared in its accounting procedures and would be taken account of by anyone who assessed the financial state of the company. The same should definitely be true of governments.

There has also been talk of bridge loans, see our previous post for a discussion of that issue.