Wrestling with a Greek restructuring

The talk of a Greek restructuring has resurfaced again, following Wolfgang Schauble’s seeming acceptance that one might be necessary in the near future. It looks like he’s back tracked today, claiming he was ‘misinterpreted’, but the damage was already done - Greek cost of borrowing has already hit new highs and the euro weakened significantly.

As we’ve noted on this blog many times (here and here, for example) and in our Greece paper, a debt restructuring is unavoidable, Greece is essentially insolvent. It’s been trying hard to enact the necessary austerity but the evidence is against the government – tax revenues have barely increased, spending cuts are proving hard to enact and the population is already fed up with austerity in all its forms.

There are a couple of points which have been raised with us recently on the negatives of a Greek debt restructuring: it will take down the Greek banking sector and there is significant moral hazard. Undoubtedly, it is a risky proposal but from what we can see, there are few other options to tackle the long term (and in this case short term) problems.

On the risk to the banking sector, there is no doubt that Greek banks hold huge amounts of Greek sovereign debt but that just serves to underline that they’re unsustainable. All the large Greek banks need to be restructured and recapitalised. Combining this with a sovereign debt restructuring is just good sense. They may need some capital injection and a lot of ECB help, they may even need to be nationalised while all this takes place but in the end the newly streamlined banks will serve the economy far better than the bloated inefficient current ones ever could.

As for the moral hazard, it is a valid concern that it could encourage other nations to seek debt relief but unfortunately we’re now in the realm of lesser evils. With bailouts or fiscal transfers you get a double moral hazard – firstly to the governments, who are not being reprimanded for their profligacy, and secondly to banks, who took huge risks which they could not cover – at least a restructuring shares the burden between the two.

It looks like Greece is coming to the end of the road, a decision needs to be made otherwise a chaotic default could be on the cards before 2013 and nobody wants that. Greece is priced out of the markets for the foreseeable future, the public is fed up with austerity and taxpayers across Europe are tired of paying to support ailing economies; what more is there to lose from a debt restructuring?

Performance problems

The problems facing German banks (and banks as a whole) have been slightly under reported in recent months. This week, though, has seen a spate of reports which pick up on just that issue.

The IMF Global Financial Stability Report pinpointed the Irish and German banks as the ones with the most "acute" need to rollover debt. Both banking sectors have about half of their outstanding debt due in the next couple of years. So expect a refinancing rush in the not too distant future (although the more immediate concern for most German banks is whether they can raise enough capital to make sure they pass the next round of stress tests).

Interestingly (and commendably), the IMF takes a much higher threshold for capital requirements than the EBA (8% compared to 5%). According to the report, a third of all European banks don't meet the IMF core capital requirements. This highlights just how lax the EBA is being in its assessments, and how precarious the position of many banks is.

According to PWC, German banks are holding €225bn in "non performing loans" - these are loans which are unlikely to be repaid (to compare: UK banks hold €175bn. Irish and Spanish banks hold €110bn and €100bn respectively). The sheer volume of risky loans held by German banks is surprising, especially considering that they hold more than the UK banking sector which is far larger. These figures are only going to increase as well, thanks to poor economic growth and the looming ECB rate rises. Once these losses start being realised they could pose a serious problem for the smaller German banks, who already have capitalisation issues.

(Yesterday it emerged that the German state of Lower Saxony will pump a further €600m of capital into regional bank NordLB, in which it holds the biggest share, aiming to help it pass EU stress tests. We're sure the Lower Saxony taxpayers are thrilled with that!)

On the surface this may seem like it detracts from the problems of the periphery and could even reduce the 'piousness' which many have accused Germany of. However, this is probably far from the truth. Unfortunately, these banking problems are systemic and not enough is being done to tackle them (or even root out their full extent).

So what needs to be done?

Well, (not that we like harping on about it) effective and transparent stress tests would be a good place to start. Combining some peripheral debt restructuring with a widespread recapitalisation programme for European banks should be the ultimate goal. This might be a painful process but it would finally deal with the issues that have been hanging around since the start of the financial crisis. There also needs to be a plan for winding down insolvent and inefficient banks (to be fair there is a 2001 directive which outlines one, but it needs updating and some political will to enforce it).

European leaders continue to turn a blind eye to the dire state of European banks and in this instance Germany is as, if not more, guilty. The level of non-performing loans, huge exposure to peripheral economies and large amounts of debt maturing highlight the trifecta of problems which European banks face; shouldn't EU leaders at least try and deal with one of them?

The dark side of the ECB

Lots of people have been focusing on the recent ECB rate rise, but the ECB’s role in this crisis has really been determined by its other – more opaque and less publicised – role: as lender of last resort. This has got the ECB into a near untenable position. It faces huge exposure to peripheral eurozone countries, it aims to maintain price stability, but has also acted to stabilise the whole eurozone economy, and it has underwritten a bloated and inefficient banking sector with unlimited cheap money.

The ECB has lent massively to the struggling European banking sector. Although this may have been viable and necessary to halt the systemic risk from the financial crisis it is now out of control. It has propped up banks that should have gone bust and created banks addicted to ECB funding. A mechanism for reining in lending and winding down banks should have been in place from the start. The ECB essentially dug itself a hole without bringing a ladder to get itself out again.

Let’s not forget, these actions also helped fuel the sovereign debt crisis by creating perverse incentives. These banks could take on cheap ECB loans and then invest in high yielding but relatively safe assets (peripheral sovereign bonds at the time), in order to turn quick profit and increase capital. This fuelled the level of government debt and when it became clear just how bad the sovereigns' finances were, markets panicked and the debt crisis hit (but with more debt and more banks involved/exposed than before).

The ECB tried to fix this problem by throwing more liquidity at it (through its bond buying programme). This just increased its exposure to risky economies, distorted bond markets and rightly raised questions over its independence and impartiality (not to mention being potentially inflationary).

Lastly, the ECB has overseen the build up of huge imbalances in the eurosystem of central banks. Some, like Ireland or Greece, borrow huge amounts but contribute little. The loans to these countries are underwritten by other central banks in the system, making them even more exposed to a peripheral default.

The ECB has played a huge role in the cycling of debt around the eurozone, and put itself in a very exposed and compromising position. Its interest rate policy is massively important but the darker side of ECB policy has debatably played a more important (and negative) role in this crisis.

To be fair to the ECB this was not all of its own making, since it was forced into this situation by eurozone leaders inaction, which is further illustration of the politicisation of a once proudly independent central bank.

Emerald Isle stress tests get a gold star (for now)

Yesterday afternoon Ireland announced the results of its recent round of banking stress tests. They showed that the banks need €24bn to recapitalise; that is undoubtedly a huge number for an economy the size of Ireland’s. So why are investors not running for the hills?

Well, from our perspective at least, the Irish stress tests seem to do something that none of the ones that have gone before have – make a genuine attempt to fully estimate the potential losses which banks could face.

This is a good start and the stress tests should be commended, but more important is how the banks and the government respond to the results. Unfortunately, that has been less commendable.

The government was expected to announce a series of measures to raise the necessary capital and set the banks on a sustainable course. However, there was only talk of ‘some’ capital being raised by investors and private lenders, with the main chunk expected to still come from the €35bn allotted to the banks by the original Irish bailout. There was also no mention of bondholders taking losses or of the widely reported new ECB medium term liquidity mechanism. So what we have is some more clarity of the state of Irish banks - which is good - but we're still missing a solid, revised plan to to address the mess.

The response of the banks was also slightly worrisome. Both AIB and Irish L&P suggested that their losses will not be as high as estimated due to the nature of the Irish mortgage market and real estate sector. This is essentially a reference to forbearance – when a lender allows a borrower extra time to repay a mortgage rather than foreclosing on the property. This allows the lenders to delay the realisation of losses, while giving the impression that the extra time given is designed to give a break to struggling taxpayers. Whatever the motivation, this is only a short term policy and, unless the Irish economy has a miraculous turnaround, most borrowers will be unable to repay these loans despite an extension in maturity.

Lastly there is the issue of the deleveraging – the sale of assets to bring the deposit-to-loan ratio back to a sustainable level – or as some people are terming it, the ‘fire sale’. Irish banks will need to shed €72bn of assets by 2013, which is a massive amount to dump into fragile financial markets. The losses on these assets will, in many cases, be substantial although the stress tests claimed to have accounted for this. Whether or not they were fully able to accurately predict the market value of some of these assets, especially since they will be sold over time, remains to be seen.

So a gold star for the stress tests (relatively at least) but they’re only a start. How the government and banks respond will deter whether Irish banks can recover quickly or whether markets will lose faith in them completely - meaning that an Irish restructering and/or another bail-out could be around the corner.

Spain gets moody

Credit rating agency Moody’s today downgraded Spanish debt partly based on the massive recapitalisation needed by the banking sector. It put the funding needs at €40bn - €50bn, or €110bn - €120bn under a “more stressed scenario”. Way above the Spanish Government’s previous estimate of €20bn.

Spain was none too pleased with this, suggesting it was premature and that Moody’s should have waited for the official statistics.

Oh, well maybe the central bank was ready to make a more accurate assessment of the banking sector funding needs – which we all expect are far greater than $20bn – ...

This afternoon the Bank of Spain released its assessment: €15.15bn...