Will an Irish bailout actually solve anything?

Open Europe has today published a briefing asking the simple question: will an Irish bail-out actually solve anything?

A healthy Irish economy is quite clearly in the UK's interest, and to extend loans to a struggling neighbour (to use Osborne's rhetoric) is in itself nothing controversial. Sweden offered cash to Iceland after that country hit the rocks following a banking meltdown (not unlike that of Ireland) for example.

And Ireland is clearly in better shape than Greece, Portugal and Spain, and a rescue package could, at best, buy Ireland some time to get their house in order - courtesy of its open economy.

However, it's also true that euro membership alters the logic - and potential effectiveness - of a bailout. As we argue in the briefing, there are five reasons why a one-off bailout for Ireland will not solve the eurozone's problems:

1. Temporary loans or greater budget discipline across the eurozone will do very little to help countries such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal regain competitiveness, the main problem these countries face.

2. In essence, what was asked of Greece, and soon Ireland, is two-thirds of a traditional IMF package - cuts in expenditure and increased taxes. However, the third, vital ingredient - currency depreciation - isn't permitted within a single currency. Instead, currency devaluation has to be replaced by so-called "internal depreciation", meaning even more squeezes to jobs and wages which aren't politically or socially affordable.

3. The ECB is likely to continue to pursue a German-style monetary policy, leading to an undervalued currency for Germany (fuelling German export-led growth) but an equally overvalued currency for the weaker economies such as Portugal and Spain (although Ireland itself could be helped by a weaker euro). This, in turn, locks in a multi-speed eurozone, with the same type of tensions we've seen over the last year coming to the fore again in future.

4. The politics of a loan bailout and stronger supranational budget rules are unsustainable. The lending countries, most importantly Germany, can only sell a de facto debt union to their electorates if it comes with strict rules and terms. But such terms imposed from the outside seriously undermine the ability of the borrowing countries to democratically govern themselves.

5. The role currently being played by the ECB is untenable, both for political and economic reasons:

• Politically, the ECB's decision back in May to start buying 'junk' government bonds from the secondary market has compromised its independence - which the Germans were promised would never happen. A bailout using loan guarantees from other EU states may allow the ECB to withdraw its emergency funding for now, but without a long-term solution the ECB is likely to be called on again to prop up ailing states.

• Economically, the situation is unsustainable as well. The Eurosystem of eurozone central banks that underpins the ECB is leveraged 24 times, while the average hedge fund is only leveraged 3 to 4 times. A fall in assets of only a few percent would wipe out the ECB's reserves, which could lead to the ECB itself being in need of a "bail-out".

As we conclude,

There are no obvious long-term solutions that do not come with huge political and economic costs. The dilemma facing the eurozone remains whether it is to become a fully fledged United States-style fiscal and therefore political union with huge continuous transfers from the German-led bloc to those on the periphery - which would inflict serious damage on the German economy; or prepare for a messy divorce possibly in the form of a two-tier euro and even some countries exiting altogether.