Kachin’s Hard and Soft Strategy

An emergency public meeting called by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in their capital of Laiza on September 5-6 was part of the ethnic ceasefire group’s strategy to prepare for its political and military future, according to well-informed sources.

After the briefing, five Kachin political leaders, including Tu Ja, the KIO’s former vice chairman, officially resigned from the organization to focus on building up the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), founded in March 2009 to contest the junta’s planned 2010 general election.

This means that the five former KIO leaders will not be involved in any decision regarding the fate of the group’s armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which has been under pressure to become a border guard force (BGF) under the command of the Burmese armed forces, the Tatmadaw.

The KIO has already rejected the Burmese junta’s demands to reconstitute the KIA as a BGF, and has proposed the formation of a so-called Kachin Regional Guard Force (KRGF) as an alternative. Unlike the BGF, the KRGF would not operate under the command of Burmese officers.

However, observers said the junta was not likely to accept any alternative arrangement, and was preparing to launch military action against any group that refused to reassign their troops to BGF battalions. They pointed out that under the regime’s new constitution, all armed forces in the union must be under the command of the Tatmadaw.

Some reports said that the junta’s No 2, Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, has ordered his troops to eliminate any ceasefire group that rejects the BGF order, including the 5,000-strong KIA.

Since the fall of the Kokang capital of Laogai on August 24, junta troops have been strengthening their positions in northern Burma. Analysts said reinforcements had been sent into the area to prepare for conflict with other ceasefire groups, including the United Wa State Army—the largest ethnic army, with about 25,000 fighters.

Military sources said that Lt-Gen Min Aung Hlaing, chief of the No 2 Bureau of Special Operations (BSO), is also keeping troops in Shan State on high alert along the Chinese border.

Ten battalions from Light Infantry Division 33 have been deployed north of Laogai and along the border with China. About 10 battalions under Military Operation Command 16, based in Theindi, northern Shan State, have been deployed south of Laogai.

Lapai Naw Din, the editor of the Thailand-based Kachin News Group, said that the deadline for the KIA to transform itself into a BGF is October 15.

Fighting between the KIA and the junta’s army could break out at any time, he said, adding that the KIA has reportedly threatened to open fire if Burmese government troops enter areas under its control.

The meeting in Laiza shows that the KIO is hastening to respond to the situation, as the recent crisis in Kokang territory and the approach of the BGF deadline add a sense of urgency, said Naw Din.

Part of the strategy is to ensure that the Kachin continue to have a political voice even if the junta moves against the KIO over the BGF issue. While the KIA maintains its military status, the Tu Ja-led KSPP will represent the Kachin politically.

“It’s clear why they [the former KIO leaders] quit. They can benefit politically, and the KIA can also move on freely with its military strategy,” said Naw Din.

irrawaddy